Democratic constitutional design and public policy: analysis and evidence
نام عام مواد
[Book]
نام نخستين پديدآور
/ edited by Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg
وضعیت نشر و پخش و غیره
محل نشرو پخش و غیره
Cambridge, Mass
نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره
: MIT Press
تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره
, 2006.
مشخصات ظاهری
نام خاص و کميت اثر
viii, 373 p.
ساير جزييات
: ill
يادداشت کلی
متن يادداشت
Papers originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Center for Business and Policy Studies
یادداشتهای مربوط به کتابنامه ، واژه نامه و نمایه های داخل اثر
متن يادداشت
Includes bibliographical references and index
یادداشتهای مربوط به مندرجات
متن يادداشت
Introduction: Rational choice politics and institutions / Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg -- Direct democracy : designing a living constitution / Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer -- Constitutions and economic policy / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini -- Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system / Thomas Stratmann -- The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies / Daniel Diermeier, Hulya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo -- On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability / Roger D. Congleton -- Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy / John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain -- Federalism : a constitutional perspective / Dennis C. Mueller -- Common tax pool problems in federal systems / Brian Knight -- Judicial independence and economic development / Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt -- Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations / Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney -- Amendment procedures and constitutional stability / Bjrn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton -- Designing constitutional stability / Barry R. Weingast