Project Air Force series on Operation Allied Force
يادداشت کلی
متن يادداشت
"Prepared for the United States Air Force. Approved for public release, distribution unlimited."
متن يادداشت
At head of title: Project Air Force.
یادداشتهای مربوط به کتابنامه ، واژه نامه و نمایه های داخل اثر
متن يادداشت
Includes bibliographical references (pages 139-155).
یادداشتهای مربوط به مندرجات
متن يادداشت
Introduction -- He assumed accepting Rambouillet terms would endanger his rule -- He assumed he could force NATO to offer better terms -- He realized that his hoped-for leverage on NATO had evaporated -- Bombing produced a popular climate conducive to concessions -- Damage to "dual-use" infrastructure generated growing pressure -- Damage to military forces and KLA "resurgence" generated little pressure -- He expected unconstrained bombing if NATO's terms were rejected -- He probably also worried about threat of future invasion -- He believed NATO's terms provided him with some political cover -- Concluding observations.
بدون عنوان
0
یادداشتهای مربوط به خلاصه یا چکیده
متن يادداشت
This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations.
یادداشتهای مربوط به نیازمندی های سیستم (منابع الکترونیک)و جزئیات فنی
متن يادداشت
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
یادداشتهای مربوط به سفارشات
منبع سفارش / آدرس اشتراک
JSTOR
شماره انبار
22573/cttd7xw
ویراست دیگر از اثر در قالب دیگر رسانه
عنوان
Conflict over Kosovo.
شماره استاندارد بين المللي کتاب و موسيقي
0833030035
عنوان اصلی به زبان دیگر
عنوان اصلي به زبان ديگر
Why Milosevic decided to settle when he did
نام شخص به منزله موضوع
موضوع مستند نشده
Milošević, Slobodan,1941-2006.
موضوع مستند نشده
Milosevic, Slobodan,((1941- ...)
موضوع مستند نشده
Milošević, Slobodan,(1941-2006)
موضوع مستند نشده
Milošević, Slobodan,1941-2006.
نام تنالگان به منزله موضوع
موضوع مستند نشده
Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord.
موضوع (اسم عام یاعبارت اسمی عام)
موضوع مستند نشده
Balkan Peninsula.
موضوع مستند نشده
Europe / Baltic States.
موضوع مستند نشده
Guerre du Kosovo (1998-1999)
موضوع مستند نشده
History & Archaeology.
موضوع مستند نشده
HISTORY-- General.
موضوع مستند نشده
HISTORY.
موضوع مستند نشده
POLITICAL SCIENCE-- Security (National & International)
موضوع مستند نشده
Regions & Countries - Europe.
نام جغرافیایی به منزله موضوع
موضوع مستند نشده
Kosovo (Republic), History, Civil War, 1998-
موضوع مستند نشده
Kosovo (Republic)
بدون عنوان
0
بدون عنوان
7
مقوله موضوعی
موضوع مستند نشده
HIS-- 010000
موضوع مستند نشده
POL011000
موضوع مستند نشده
POL012000
رده بندی ديویی
شماره
949
.
7103
ويراست
21
رده بندی کنگره
شماره رده
DR2087
نشانه اثر
.
H67
2001eb
نام شخص به منزله سر شناسه - (مسئولیت معنوی درجه اول )