عنوان

Guardians of finance :

شابک

0262301520

شابک

0262302306

شابک

1280498951

شابک

6613594180

شابک

9780262301527

شابک

9780262302302

شابک

9781280498954

شابک

9786613594181

شابک اشتباه

0262017393

شابک اشتباه

9780262017398

عنوان اصلي

Guardians of finance :

نام عام مواد

[Book]

ساير اطلاعات عنواني

making regulators work for us /

نام نخستين پديدآور

James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine.

محل نشرو پخش و غیره

Cambridge, Mass. :

نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره

MIT Press,

تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره

©2012.

نام خاص و کميت اثر

1 online resource (xiii, 280 pages)

متن يادداشت

Includes bibliographical references and index.

متن يادداشت

Introduction -- Regulating finance is hard to do -- Incentives run amok -- How U.S. regulators encouraged the financial crisis -- American crisis? Ain't necessarily so -- Been down this road many times before -- More of the same: post 2007-2009 financial crisis regulation -- Making the guardians of finance work for us.

بدون عنوان

0

متن يادداشت

"The recent financial crisis was an accident, a 'perfect storm' fueled by an unforeseeable confluence of events that unfortunately combined to bring down the global financial systems. And policy makers? They did everything they could, given their limited authority. It was all a terrible, unavoidable accident. Or at least this is the story told and retold by a chorus of luminaries that includes Timothy Geithner, Henry Paulson, Robert Rubin, Ben Bernanke, and Alan Greenspan. In Guardians of Finance, economists James Barth, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine argue that the financial meltdown of 2007 to 2009 was no accident; it was negligent homicide. They show that senior regulatory officials around the world knew or should have known that their policies were destabilizing the global financial system, had years to process the evidence that risks were rising, had the authority to change their policies--and yet chose not to act until the crisis had fully emerged. The current system, the authors write, is simply not designed to make policy choices on behalf of the public. It is virtually impossible for the public and its elected officials to obtain informed and impartial assessment of financial regulation and to hold regulators accountable. Barth, Caprio, and Levine propose a reform to counter this systemic failure: the establishment of a 'Sentinel' to provide an informed, expert, and independent assessment of financial regulation. Its sole power would be to demand information and to evaluate it from the perspective of the public--rather than that of the financial industry, the regulators, or politicians"--Provided by publisher.

منبع سفارش / آدرس اشتراک

JSTOR

منبع سفارش / آدرس اشتراک

MIL

منبع سفارش / آدرس اشتراک

MIT Press

منبع سفارش / آدرس اشتراک

MIT Press

منبع سفارش / آدرس اشتراک

OverDrive, Inc.

شماره انبار

22573/ctt127hj1w

شماره انبار

359418

شماره انبار

9065

شماره انبار

9780262301527

شماره انبار

E5E9B857-C589-4C59-93C7-6B205268D07B

عنوان

Guardians of finance.

شماره استاندارد بين المللي کتاب و موسيقي

9780262017398

موضوع مستند نشده

Banks and banking-- United States.

موضوع مستند نشده

Finance-- Government policy-- United States.

موضوع مستند نشده

Financial crises-- United States-- Prevention.

موضوع مستند نشده

Financial crises-- United States.

موضوع مستند نشده

Financial institutions-- United States.

موضوع مستند نشده

Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.

موضوع مستند نشده

Banks and banking.

موضوع مستند نشده

BUSINESS & ECONOMICS-- Finance.

موضوع مستند نشده

Finance-- Government policy.

موضوع مستند نشده

Financial crises-- Prevention.

موضوع مستند نشده

Financial crises.

موضوع مستند نشده

Financial institutions.

موضوع مستند نشده

United States.

بدون عنوان

7

موضوع مستند نشده

BUS-- 027000

موضوع مستند نشده

BUS027000

شماره

ويراست

شماره رده

نشانه اثر

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Barth, James R.

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Caprio, Gerard

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Levine, Ross

تاريخ عمليات

20200822104534.0

قواعد فهرست نويسي ( بخش توصيفي )

pn

نام الکترونيکي

نوع ماده

[Book]

تكميل شده

Y