The Representational Sources of Political Inequality
General Material Designation
[Thesis]
First Statement of Responsibility
Hayes, Thomas J.
Subsequent Statement of Responsibility
Bishin, Benjamin G
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
UC Riverside
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2012
DISSERTATION (THESIS) NOTE
Body granting the degree
UC Riverside
Text preceding or following the note
2012
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Among the main tenets of American democracy are liberty, popular sovereignty, and equality. While each has seen expansion over the course of American history, the recent growth in economic inequality could threaten each of these core democratic features. As political equality is a prerequisite central to each of these values, I investigate the question: where does political inequality come from? In order to research the sources of political inequality, I examine the nature of inequality in each of three aspects of the American governmental system: institutions (e.g. Congress), individuals (e.g. voters), and theinteraction between the two (e.g. responsiveness).At its founding, the American government was set up to be a republican democracy. In this light, I focus on the role of representation in the U.S. political system and the degreeto which certain groups receive higher levels of responsiveness, defined as the level of correspondence between constituency preferences and a legislator's behavior (e.g. Miller andStokes 1963; Achen 1978), and other groups do not. Because modern democratic theory assumes the continued responsiveness of the government to all citizens (considered aspolitical equals) my primary focus is to examine the degree to which this equal responsiveness is broken, which can be a source of political inequality (Dahl 1971). The argument that I make throughout the dissertation is that economic inequality greatly affectspolitical inequality. While this thesis may not seem novel, recent studies that have uncovered evidence of unequal governmental responsiveness have been unable to provide an accountof why this occurs (Gilens 2005; Bartels 2008).In the dissertation I explore three questions. First, how pervasive is political inequality? In order to answer this question I examine the behavior of members of Congress and the degree to which they respond to different economic classes. As Congress is themain body designed to represent the people's voice, I focus intensely on this institution.The second question, which focuses on the role of the people, is: Does the public view inequality as a problem? In researching this question, I will examine individual preferencesfrom the mass public in order to understand people's attitudes toward inequality. Individual indifference to economic inequality and an inability to hold elected officials accountable could be a main source of political inequality. Finally, I examine the interaction between individual (and group) preferences and political institutions and ask the question: What accounts for legislator bias toward different groups? To this end, I examine the influenceson legislator behavior such as member personal wealth, party, competitiveness, constituent preference (majority and subconstituency), constituent participatory factors (e.g. voting,volunteering, donating, etc.), and political knowledge.