Includes bibliographical references (pages 159-222) and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- PART I. THE TRIUMPH OF AN IDEA -- 1 The Rise of Constitutional Courts -- 2 Historical Background: The Principle of Separation of Powers -- 3 A Traditional Justification: Legal Certainty -- PART II. EXPLORING THE ADVANTAGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS -- 4 The Justification of Constitutional Review: The Sketch of an Argument -- 5 The Special Nature of Constitutional Discourse -- 6 The Structure of the Constitutional Conversation -- 7 Overcoming Judicial Timidity -- 8 The Democratic Objection to Constitutional Review
Text of Note
9 Democratic Checks on CourtsPART III. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS UNDER PRESSURE -- 10 Decentralizing Tendencies in the System -- 11 The Impact of the European Court of Justice -- 12 The Impact of the European Court of Human Rights -- Afterword -- Notes -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z
0
8
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Víctor Ferreres Comella contrasts the European 'centralised' constitutional court model, in which one court system is used to adjudicate constitutional questions, with a decentralised model such as that of the United States, in which courts deal with both constitutional and non-constitutional questions.