edited by J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin Jarvis.
EDITION STATEMENT
Edition Statement
First edition.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Oxford :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Oxford University Press,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2017.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
1 online resource
GENERAL NOTES
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This edition previously issued in print: 2017.
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
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Includes bibliographical references and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
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Cover; Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind; Copyright; Contents; List of Contributors; 1: Knowledge First: An Introduction; 1. Knowledge-First: A Background; 2. Knowledge-First: A Motivation; 3. Knowledge-First: A Research Program; 4. Knowledge-First: The Volume; 5. Overview of Chapters; 5.1 Foundational issues; 5.2 Applications and new directions; References; Part I: Foundational Issues; 2: How and Why Knowledge is First; 1. Introduction; 2. Internalism; 3. Externalism; 3.1 Reasons-first and the reconciliatory view of perception; 3.2 The second reconciliatory view
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3. Natural Kind Externalism4. Social Externalism; 5. Demonstrative Externalism; 6. Disjunctivism; 7. Counting the Cost; References; 6: On Putting Knowledge 'First'; 1. Introduction; 2. A Quick History; 3. A Taxonomy of Priority; 3.1 Metaphysical priority; 3.2 Representational priority; 4. Connections Between Families?; 5. The Way Forward; References; 7: No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion; 1. Introduction; 2. Knowledge-First Epistemology; 3. ... and its Limits; 4. The Knowledge Norm of Assertion; 5. Excuses, Excuses
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3.3 A third reconciliatory view?4. Evidence and Justification; References; 3: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology; 1. Introduction; 1.1 Terminology and notation; 2. Characterizing Knowledge-First Epistemology; 2.2 Reductive and non-reductive knowledge-first epistemologies; 2.3 Characterizations of knowledge-first epistemology in conclusion; 3. Critique of Reductive Knowledge-First Epistemology; 4. Non-reductive Knowledge Norms of Assertion and Action; 4.1 Knowledge norms of assertion and their competitors; 4.2 Challenges to the knowledge norm
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4.3 Non-reductive knowledge-first epistemology in conclusion5. Towards a 'Nothing's First' Alternative: Equilibristic Epistemology; 5.1 Equilibristic epistemology; Conclusion; References; 4: Mindreading Knowledge; 1. Introduction; 2. De We Acquire Knowledge First?; 2.1 Williamson on the priority of knowledge; 2.2 Nagel on the priority of knowledge; 2.3 Evidence of infant mindreading; 2.4 Animal mindreading; 3. Knowledge as a Precondition of Belief; 4. Concluding Remarks; References; 5: The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State; 1. Introduction; 2. The Objection from Internalism
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6. No Excuses Necessary7. Conclusion: Assertion without Knowledge; References; Part II: Applications and New Directions; 8: Acting on Knowledge; 1. A nalogies Between Knowledge and Action; 2. The Analogy with Intention; 3. Knowing is to Believing as Acting is to Intending; 4. Directions of Explanation; 5. Extending the Analogy; 6. Conclusion; References; 9: Perception First?; 1. Introduction; 2. Preliminaries; 3. Causal Analyses of Object Perception; 4. Counterexamples are Not Enough; 5. A Positive Account of Perception?; References
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
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'Knowledge First' constitutes what is widely regarded as one of the most significant innovations in contemporary epistemology in the past 25 years. Knowledge-first epistemology is the idea that knowledge per se should not be analysed in terms of its constituent parts (e.g., justification, belief), but rather that these and other notions should be analysed in terms of the concept of knowledge. This volume features a substantive introduction and 13 original essays from leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of knowledge-first philosophy.