عنوان
پدید آورنده
موضوع
رده
کتابخانه
محل استقرار
NATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY NUMBER
Number
TL49399
LANGUAGE OF THE ITEM
.Language of Text, Soundtrack etc
انگلیسی
TITLE AND STATEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
Title Proper
Transparent They Endure: Causes and Consequences of Fiscal Transparency in Hybrid Regimes
General Material Designation
[Thesis]
First Statement of Responsibility
Ghazal Poshtkouhian Nadi
Subsequent Statement of Responsibility
Eisenstadt, Todd
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
American University
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2017
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
230
GENERAL NOTES
Text of Note
Committee members: Moore, Ryan T.; Vreeland, James R.
NOTES PERTAINING TO PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Text of Note
Place of publication: United States, Ann Arbor; ISBN=978-1-369-82611-1
DISSERTATION (THESIS) NOTE
Dissertation or thesis details and type of degree
Ph.D.
Discipline of degree
Government
Body granting the degree
American University
Text preceding or following the note
2017
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
This dissertation examines the causes of budget transparency in hybrid regimes and the impact of this transparency on political processes and government accountability in these regimes. Utilizing a mixed-methods approach consisting of cross-national statistical analysis, time-series analysis, and comparative case studies of Turkey, Tunisia, Jordan and Iran, this study focuses on the impact of International Financial Institutions on adoption of fiscal transparency standards in hybrid regimes. Using an original formal index of regime typology, this study identifies two hybrid regime subtypes including hegemonic electoral authoritarian and competitive authoritarian, and shows that among hybrid regimes, competitive authoritarians with higher dependence on assistance from the international community tend to be fiscally more transparent. Examining the impact of such transparency on political processes in hybrid regimes, the second part of this study demonstrates that in general political business cycles (politically motivated manipulation of economic policies during electoral years) are less likely in hybrid regimes which are fiscally more transparent.
TOPICAL NAME USED AS SUBJECT
Political science
UNCONTROLLED SUBJECT TERMS
Subject Term
Social sciences;Endure;Fiscal;Regimes;Transparency;Transparent
PERSONAL NAME - PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
West, Rachel
PERSONAL NAME - SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITY
Eisenstadt, Todd
CORPORATE BODY NAME - SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITY
Subdivision
Government
American University
LOCATION AND CALL NUMBER
Call Number
1912522623; 10254551
ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Electronic name
مطالعه متن کتاب p
[Thesis]
276903
a
Y
