credibility and the strength of weak governments /
First Statement of Responsibility
Irfan Nooruddin.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Cambridge :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Cambridge University Press,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2011.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
1 online resource (xv, 249 pages) :
Other Physical Details
digital, PDF file(s)
GENERAL NOTES
Text of Note
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
1. Introduction -- 2. Coalition politics and economic development: theory -- 3. Coalition politics and economic development: empirics -- 4. Coalition politics and economic development: mechanisms -- 5. Coalition dharma and India shining -- 6. Developing coalitions in Italy, Spain, Brazil, and Botswana -- 7. Conclusion.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics.