1. Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories.- 2. On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Cooperative Games.- 3. A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game.- 4. Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points.- 5. Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof.- 6. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model.- 7. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points.- 8. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game.- 9. Uses of Bayesian Probability Models in Game Theory.- 10. An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition.- 11. A New General Solution Concept for Both Cooperative and Noncooperative Games.- 12. Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior.
رده بندی کنگره
شماره رده
QA269
نشانه اثر
.
J646
2010
نام شخص به منزله سر شناسه - (مسئولیت معنوی درجه اول )