Includes bibliographical references (pages 415-428) and indexes.
Practical intelligence and the virtues : an aristotelian approach -- Deliberation -- Phronesis -- The phronesis controversy -- Phronesis, virtue, and right action -- Right action for virtue ethics -- Right action and serious practical concerns -- Two constraints on right action -- Must virtue ethics accept the act constraint? -- Can virtue ethics accept the act constraint? -- Right action and virtuous motives -- The structure of agent-based virtue ethics -- Virtuous acts and virtuous motivations -- Why virtues are virtues -- Reasons for virtue -- Right action and 'the virtuous person' -- Doing without 'the virtuous person' -- 'Virtuous enough' -- Ideals and aspirations -- Virtues, persons, and 'the virtuous person' -- Representing 'the virtuous person' -- The enumeration problem -- The enumeration problem -- The enumeration problem : an introduction -- Enumeration and overall virtuous actions -- Enumeration and overall virtuous persons -- Enumeration and naturalism -- Individuating the virtues -- From individuation to enumeration -- 'The same reasons' -- Reasons, individuation, and cardinality -- Implications for hard virtue ethics -- Magnificence, generosity, and subordination -- Magnificence as a virtue -- Subordination, specialization, and cardinality -- Alternatives to the subordination view -- Situations, dispositions, and virtues -- Situations and broad-based dispositions -- Situationism and dispositionism -- Situationism and personality -- Idiographic predictions of consistency -- Situations and dispositions : examining the evidence -- How to test broad-based dispositions for cross-situational consistency -- Putting dispositions to the test : four representative experiments -- Interpreting the findings -- From situationism to virtue theory -- Situationism : from empirical to philosophical psychology -- Situationism and virtue theory : normative adequacy -- From common sense to virtue theory? -- Out-sourcing the empirical work? -- A cognitive-affective approach to the virtues -- Defending hard virtue theory -- Phronesis and the unity of the virtues -- The unity of which virtues? -- Attributive and model theses -- Responsibility for character -- Depth, self-construction, and responsibility -- On responsibility and ultimate responsibility for character -- What is critical distance? -- From critical distance to responsibility -- Objections to the critical distance view.
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Daniel Russell develops the idea that a necessary part of virtue is practical intelligence, the skill of determining what the right (e.g. kind or fair) thing to do would be on a given occasion, which requires much time, experience and practice. This idea has a key role to play in contemporary virtue ethics.