edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard ; with replies by Timothy Williamson.
New York :
Oxford University Press,
2009.
1 online resource (viii, 400 pages) :
illustrations
Includes bibliographical references (pages 385-391) and index.
Contributors; Introduction; 1. E = K and Perceptual Knowledge; 2. Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed?; 3. Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against; 4. The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Nature; 5. Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence; 6. Knowledge and Objective Chance; 7. Primeness, Internalism, Explanation; 8. Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism; 9. Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries; 10. Defeating the Dogma of Defeasibility; 11. Evidence = Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism; 12. Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits.
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16 leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's claim that knowledge is a mental state.