the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy /
John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan.
New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2002.
xv, 284 pages :
illustrations ;
24 cm
Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Includes bibliographical references (pages 259-274) and indexes.
"The authors address these issues by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the U.S. states, they argue that particular institutional forms - such as the nature of electoral laws, the structure of the legal system, and the professionalism of the legislature - have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policymaking process."--Jacket.
"The laws that legislature adopt provide a crucial opportunity for elected politicians to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy vary considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in an effort to micromanage policymaking processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial discretion to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter?"
Bureaucracy.
Comparative government.
Law-- Political aspects.
Political planning.
Separation of powers.
Bureaucratie.
Institutions politiques comparées.
Politique publique.
Séparation des pouvoirs.
88.70 comparative study of public administration.
Autonomie (algemeen)
Bureaucracy.
Bureaucratie.
Bürokratie
Comparative government.
Law-- Political aspects.
Législation-- États-Unis.
Political planning.
Politische Planung
Pouvoir discrétionnaire (droit administratif)-- États-Unis.