Cover; Normative Externalism; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; 1: Introduction; 1.1 To Thine Own Self Be True; 1.2 Four Questions; 1.2.1 Actions, agents, or advice; 1.2.2 Above all?; 1.2.3 Ethics, epistemology, and more; 1.2.4 Actual or rational; 1.2.5 Some caveats; 1.3 Normative Externalism Defined; 1.4 Guidance; 1.5 Symmetry; 1.6 Regress; 1.7 Two Recent Debates; 1.8 Elizabeth and Descartes; 1.9 Why Call This Externalism?; 1.10 Plan of Book; PART I: Ethics; 2: All About Internalism; 2.1 Some Distinctions; 2.2 Two Ways of Maximizing Expected Goodness; 2.3 Varieties of Internalism
2.4 An Initial Constraint2.5 Motivation One: Guidance; 2.6 Motivation Two: Recklessness; 2.7 Motivation Three: Symmetry; 3: Against Symmetry; 3.1 Guilt and Shame; 3.2 Jackson Cases; 3.2.1 Case one-Abortion; 3.2.2 Case two-Theft; 3.2.3 An asymmetry; 3.3 Motivation; 3.4 Welfare and Motivation; 3.5 Motivation, Virtues, and Vices; 3.6 The Weak Motivation Principle (WMP); 3.6.1 Equilibrium; 3.6.2 Why engage in moral reflection?; 3.6.3 The WMP and two kinds of motivation gaps; 3.6.4 Against symmetry; 3.7 The Strong Motivation Principle (SMP); 3.7.1 How to explain reflection
3.7.2 Against motivation by morality3.7.3 Back to symmetry, and moral uncertainty; 3.8 Motivation Through Thick and Thin; 3.9 Moller's Example; 4: A Dilemma for Internalism; 4.1 Six Forms of Internalism; 4.2 Two Difficult Cases; 4.3 Inadvertent Virtue and Misguided Conscience; 4.4 Ethics and Epistemology; 4.5 Rationality and Symmetry; 4.6 Conclusion; 5: Blame and Moral Ignorance; 5.1 Does Moral Ignorance Excuse?; 5.2 Why Believe MIE?; 5.3 Chapter Plan; 5.4 Blame and Desire; 5.5 Blame, Agents, and Time; 5.6 Acting in Ignorance Is No Excuse
5.7 Against Counterfactual Interpretations of Acting from Ignorance5.8 Against Motivational Interpretations of Acting From Ignorance; 5.9 Adopting a Decision Procedure and Acting on It; 5.10 Calhoun on Blame and Blameworthiness; 5.11 Moral Mistakes and Moral Strangers; 5.12 Two Approaches to Blame; 6: Double Standards; 6.1 Hypocrites; 6.1.1 Why hypocrisy?; 6.1.2 The hypocrite and the rationalizer; 6.1.3 Recklessness and character; 6.2 Value Comparisons; 6.3 The Externalist's Commitments; PART II: Epistemology; 7: Level-Crossing Principles; 7.1 First-Order and Second-Order Epistemology
7.2 Change Evidentialism7.3 Motivations for Level-Crossing; 7.3.1 Higher-order evidence; 7.3.2 Akrasia; 7.3.3 Disagreement; 7.4 The Plan for the Rest of the Book; 7.5 Evidence, Rationality, and Wisdom; 7.6 Evidence, Thought, and Mathematics; 8: Higher-Order Evidence; 8.1 Varieties of Higher-Order Examples; 8.2 Diagnoses and Alternatives; 8.3 Tiredness and Abduction; 8.4 Explaining All Four Cases; 8.5 Against Bracketing; 9: Circles, Epistemic and Benign; 9.1 Normative Externalism and Circularity; 9.2 Inference, Implication, and Transmission; 9.3 Liberalism, Defeaters, and Circles
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Brian Weatherson argues that it is not important for people to live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: they should do the right thing and they should believe rationally. So moral uncertainty should not be treated like factual uncertainty.