Cover; Series; Articulating the Moral Community; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; PART ONE: Preliminaries; Introduction; I.1. The Universality of the Moral Community; I.2. Illustrative Examples of Decentered Moral Innovation; I.3. The Possibility of Indeterminacy-Reducing Moral Progress; I.4. Basic Conditions on How New Moral Norms Can Be Socially Introduced; I.5. Preview of the Argument; 1. Constructive Ethical Pragmatism; 1.1. Characterizing Constructive Ethical Pragmatism; 1.2. Moral Theory as Having a Practical Role; 1.3. The Flexibility of Constructive Ethical Pragmatism
1.4. Constructive Ethical Pragmatism Will Guide Deliberation BetterPART TWO: The Moral Authority of the Moral Community; 2. The Idea of the Moral Community; 2.1. Ways of Modeling the Moral Community; 2.2. Kant on the Ethical Community; 2.3. Norms to Structure the Moral Community; 2.4. The Unity of the Universal Moral Community: Thompson's Challenge; 3. Authoritative Input: Dyadic Duties and Rights; 3.1. The Specificatory Theory of Dyadic Moral Rights and Duties; 3.2. Rival Theories of Dyadic Rights and Duties?; 3.3. Addressing Human Rights
3.4. Generalizing the Account to Include Transactional Duties and Private Rights3.5. From Specific Address to the Specificatory Theory of Dyadic Rights and Duties; 3.6. Objections to the Specificatory Theory; 3.7. The Specificatory Theory Compared to the Will Theory; 3.8. The Input Stage; 4. The Unity of the Moral Community; 4.1. Bringing Intelligent Beings Together Under One System of Norms; 4.2. Effacing the Boundaries Between Distinct Practices; 4.3. Knitting Together Morally Disagreeing Communities; 4.4. Looking Beyond Individual Human Nature to the Social
4.5. Beyond Interacting Intelligent Beings4.6. How All Persons Can Be United in a Single Moral Community; 5. Introducing New Moral Norms; 5.1. Selection and Convergence; 5.2. The Very Idea of Moral Authority; 5.3. The Moral Community's Authority Respects Autonomy; 5.4. New Moral Norms; 5.5. New Objective Norms; 6. Working It Out together: Joint Moral Reasoning; 6.1. Why a New Account of Jointly Embodied Moral Reasoning Is Needed; 6.2. Generality, Inclusiveness, and Deference to Authority; 6.3. A Model of Embodied, Joint Moral Reasoning; 7. Ratification of New Moral Norms
7.1. Mutual Recognition of Acceptance7.2. The Problem of Future Persons; 7.3. Backward-Looking Awareness; 7.4. Reasoning in the Ratification Stage; 7.5. Ratification: Summing up; PART THREE: Defending and Extending the Account; 8. Reasons, Indeterminacy, and Compromise; 8.1. The Appeal of the Set of First-Order Reasons; 8.2. The Moral-Psychological Objection; 8.3. Reasoning in Terms of Ends; 8.4. The Role of Commitments; 8.5. Compromise: Working Things Out Together; 8.6. Reasons and Reasoning; 9. Noneternal Moral Principles; 9.1. Cudworth's Essentialist Argument for Moral Rationalism
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Is morality fixed objectively, independently of all human judgment, or do we ""invent"" right and wrong? Articulating the Moral Community argues that neither of these simple answers is correct. Its central thesis is that, working within zones of objective indeterminacy, the moral community-the community of all persons-has the authority to introduce new moral norms.