Intro; Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; About the Authors; 1 Introduction: Conversations on the Problems of Identity, Consciousness and Mind; 1.1 The Method of Conversational Thinking; 1.2 The Background of the Conversations; 1.3 The Conversations; 1.4 Conclusion; References; 2 A Sense-Phenomenal Look at the Problem of Personal Identity; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 From Hard Problem to the Harder Problem; 2.3 The Identity Problem and the Model of Sense-Phenomenalism; 2.3.1 Mental Surgery: A Thought Experiment; 2.4 The Argument
2.5 In Defense of a Sense-Phenomenal Approach to the Identity Problem2.6 Conclusion; References; 3 Neurophilosophy and the Problem of Consciousness: An Equiphenomenal Perspective; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Of Neurophilosophy and Consciousness: How to Understand the Problem; 3.2.1 Neurophilosophy; 3.2.2 Consciousness; 3.3 What Neurophilosophy Says About Consciousness?; 3.4 What Really is the Problem of Consciousness?; 3.5 Theories of Consciousness; 3.5.1 Dualist Theories; 3.5.2 Physicalists Theories; 3.5.3 Other Theories; 3.6 Accounting for Consciousness: Between First-Person and Third-Person Data
3.7 Dissecting the Concept Equiphenomenalism3.8 Epiphenomenalism and Equiphenomenalism; 3.9 Consciousness from an Equiphenomenal Perspective: Towards an Objective-Subjective Explanation; 3.10 Conclusion; References; 4 Proto-phenomenalism as an Explanatory Model to the Mind-Body Problem: A Neurophilosophical Inquiry; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Introducing Proto-phenomenalism: Historical Preludes; 4.3 The Nature of Neurophilosophy; 4.4 The Proto-phenomenal Model of Neurophilosophy: An Answer to the Mind-Body Dilemma; 4.4.1 The Two Levels of Proto-phenomenal Explanations
4.4.2 The Idea of a Mind and all Perceived Mental States are Category Mistakes4.5 Proto-phenomenalism and the Problem of Qualia: Addressing the Major Criticism of Neurophilosophy; 4.6 Some Implications of the Proto-phenomenal Model of Neurophilosophy; 4.7 Conclusion; References; Index
0
8
8
8
This book introduces concepts in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy. Inside, three scholars offer approaches to the problems of identity, consciousness, and the mind. In the process, they open new vistas for thought and raise fresh controversies to some of the oldest problems in philosophy. The first chapter focuses on the identity problem. The author employs an explanatory model he christened sense-phenomenalism to defend the thesis that personal identity is something or a phenomenon that pertains to the observable/perceptible aspect of the human person. The next chapter explores the problem of consciousness. It deploys the new concept equiphenomenalism as a model to show that mental properties are not by-products but necessary products of consciousness. Herein, the notion of qualia is a fundamental and necessary product that must be experienced simultaneously with neural activities for consciousness to be possible. The last chapter addresses the mind/body problem. It adopts the new concept proto-phenomenalism as an alternative explanatory model. This model eliminates the idea of a mind. As such, it approaches the mind-body problem from a materialistic point of view with many implications such as, the meaning(lessness) of our existence, the possibility of thought engineering as well as religious implications.
Springer Nature
com.springer.onix.9783030142629
New conversations on the problems of identity, consciousness and mind.