Place of publication: United States, Ann Arbor; ISBN=978-1-303-98048-0
Ph.D.
Economics (LeBow College of Business)
Drexel University
2014
There are two ways for a venture capital (VC) firm to enter a new market: initiate a new deal or form a syndicate with an incumbent. Both types of entry events are extensively observed in the data. This dissertation examines (i) the causes of syndication between entrant and incumbent VC firms, (ii) the impact of entry on VC contract terms and survival rates of VC-backed start-up companies, and (iii ) the effect of syndication between entrant and incumbent VC firms on the competition in the VC market and the outcomes of incumbent-backed ventures. This dissertation contributes to the existing literature by developing an analytical framework to examine the strategic interactions between entrant and incumbent VC firms, and to investigate the impact of VC firms' entry and syndication on the survival of VC-backed start-ups.
Economics; Finance
Social sciences;Bilateral bargaining;Entrepreneurship;Syndication;Venture capital