I: Deliberation --; The Possibility of Philosophy of Action --; The Real Reasons --; Reasons and the First Person --; Freedom in Belief and Desire --; Goodwill, Determinism and Justification --; Making X Happen: Prolepsis and the Problem of Mental Determination --; II: Causation --; Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior --; What Can the Semantic Properties of Innate Representations Explain? --; The Efficacy of Content: A Functionalist Theory --; Two Claims that Can Save a Nonreductive Account of Mental Causation --; What We Do: a Nonreductive Approach to Human Action --; Robust Activity, Event-Causation, and Agent-Causation --; Name Index.
The essays collected together in this volume, many of them written by leading scholars in the field, explore the commonsensical fact that our presence as reasonable agents makes a causal difference to the course of events in the world. It is generally acknowledged that two distinct processes are involved in human action: deliberation and causation - processes that should be described in very different ways. Although each contributor to this volume will think differently about how to conceive of the relation between these processes, all agree that progress in the philosophy of mind and action will depend upon a better understanding of the relation between deliberation and causation. This collection will be of interest to professionals and graduate students working in the philosophy of mind and action as well as in related disciplines such as metaphysics, philosophy of psychology and moral psychology.