عنوان
پدید آورنده
موضوع
رده
K2390 .W654 1996
K2390
.
W654
1996
کتابخانه
محل استقرار
3642614671
9783642614675
b571798
Litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information :
[Book]
an experimental study
Wolfgang Ryll.
Berlin ; New York
Springer
©1996.
(viii, 174 pages) : illustrations
Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 440.
Introduction --; The Game-Teoretic Model and Equilibrium Sets --; Experimental Design and Organisation of the Experiment --; Experimental Results --; Learning Theories --; Monte-Carlo Simulations and Testing of the Learning Direction Theory Against a Simple Alternative Theory --; Comparison of the Results of Direction Learning and the Simple Alternative Theory --; Summary.
The book investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design allows investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. A prominence level analysis is applied to the data and suggests that subjects tend to choose "round" numbers. It is shown that there exists a correlation between machiavellianism and subjects' adjustment behaviour in the game. The learning behaviour is discussed extensively. Plaintiffs' acceptance limits polarize at the beginning of the second play. A model of learning direction theory applied to explain subjects's behaviour over the course of the game.
Actions and defenses -- Psychological aspects.
Compromise (Law) -- Psychological aspects.
Dispute resolution (Law) -- Psychological aspects.
K2390
.
W654
1996
Wolfgang Ryll.
Wolfgang Ryll
مطالعه متن کتاب [Book]
Y
