I: Introducing the Subject.- 1. Introduction.- 1.1. Voter behavior and economics.- 1.2. An outline of the book.- 2. Existing Studies in the Field.- 2.1. Introduction.- 2.2. Economic analyses of voter behavior.- 2.3. Median voter models.- 2.4. Conclusions.- II: Empirical Models Applied to the Netherlands.- 3. An Empirical Analysis of Voter Turnout in the Netherlands.- 3.1. Introduction.- 3.2. Survey of the literature.- 3.3. Data and selection of variables.- 3.4. Multivariate analysis.- 3.5. Some special topics.- 3.5.1 A comparison of the voting behavior of partners.- 3.5.2 National versus local elections.- 3.6. Concluding remarks.- Appendix 3A.- Appendix 3B.- 4. An Empirical Analysis of Party Choice in the Netherlands.- 4.1. Introduction.- 4.2. The model.- 4.3. Characteristics of Dutch parties and expected effects of variables.- 4.3.1 Dutch party characteristics.- 4.3.2 Expected effects of the variables distinguished.- 4.4. Data and first results.- 4.4.1 The data.- 4.4.2 The sequential decision voter.- 4.4.3 Former party choice.- 4.5. The sequential versus the simultaneous decision voter.- 4.5.1 The simultaneous decision voter.- 4.5.2 The sequential versus the simultaneous decision model: a test.- 4.6. Some implications.- 4.6.1 The `left-right' scale.- 4.6.2 Marginal effects.- 4.7. Concluding discussion.- Appendix 4A.- Appendix 4B.- Appendix 4C.- III: A Behavioral Model of Party Choice and the Demand for Public Goods.- 5. A Behavioral Model of Party Choice.- 5.1. Introduction.- 5.2. The model.- 5.2.1 Individual versus group interests.- 5.2.2 Party choice.- 5.2.3 The reduced form equations.- 5.3. A comparison with existing models.- 5.3.1 Economic models: popularity functions.- 5.3.2 Other economic models.- 5.3.3 Spatial models of voting behavior.- 5.4. Concluding remarks.- Appendix 5A.- 6. Empirical Applications: the Demand for Public Goods.- 6.1. Introduction.- 6.2. An empirical application to the Netherlands.- 6.2.1 The equations to be estimated.- 6.2.2 The empirical results.- 6.3. An empirical application to Great Britain.- 6.3.1 The equations to be estimated.- 6.3.2 The results for workers.- 6.3.3 Other groups.- 6.3.4 Original parameters.- 6.4. Concluding remarks.- Appendix 6A.- 7. Expressed Preferences for Public Goods.- 7.1. Introduction.- 7.2. The survey method.- 7.3. Two surveys applied.- 7.3.1 The SCP-survey.- 7.3.2 The Amsterdam-survey.- 7.4. Conclusions.- IV: The Calculus of Voting.- 8. Voter Turnout and Social Pressure.- 8.1. Introduction.- 8.2. Optimal group behavior.- 8.3. Individual turnout I: producers of social pressure.- 8.4. Individual turnout II: consumers of social pressure.- 8.5. Concluding discussion.- Appendix 8A.- Appendix 8B.- Appendix 8C.- Appendix 8D.- 9. Some Implications of the Turnout Model.- 9.1. Introduction.- 9.2. Equilibrium analysis.- 9.3. Winner-takes-all elections.- 9.4. Empirics.- 9.4.1 Party or election specific variables.- 9.4.2 Socio-economic variables.- 9.5. Conclusion.- Appendix 9A.- Appendix 9B.- Appendix 9C.- Epilogue.- 10. Summary and Evaluation.- 10.1. Introduction.- 10.2. Summary.- 10.2.1 General summary of the book.- 10.2.2 Summary of Part II.- 10.2.3 Summary of Part III.- 10.2.4 Summary of Part IV.- 10.3. Evaluation.- 10.3.1 The importance of the group-framework.- 10.3.2 Voter turnout and party choice.- 10.3.3 The economic perspective.- References.- Author Index.- List of Symbols.