a theoretical and empirical study of rational choice /
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner.
Cambridge, Mass. :
Harvard University Press,
2013.
xv, 422 pages :
illustrations ;
25 cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
A realistic theory of judicial behavior -- The previous empirical literature -- The Supreme Court -- The Courts of Appeals -- The district courts and the selection effect -- Dissents and dissent aversion -- The questioning of lawyers at oral argument -- The auditioners.
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"Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well-understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made"--Provided by publisher.