The thesis comprises three empirical papers on the political economy of decentralisation in Indonesia. The first paper examines the effect of local majority (political party) coalitions on district fiscal and service outcomes. Applying a regression discontinuity approach, the paper finds that districts with majority coalitions raise more own-revenues and spend more, especially on health functions, than districts with minority coalitions. The analysis also determines that majority coalition districts improve access to health services. The findings suggest that majority coalition governments can, in part, mitigate the negative effects of political fragmentation at the district level. The second paper examines the incumbency advantage of mayors running for re-election. The paper investigates individual candidate (as opposed to political party) incumbency across elections from 2005 to 2017. The study applies regression discontinuity methods to a newly developed dataset on mayoral elections. The analysis finds very strong (unconditional) incumbency effects: incumbents are slightly less than 50 percent more likely to run in the next election than non-incumbents and they are also around 50 percent more likely to run and win the election than their non-incumbent counterparts. Furthermore, the study determines that these effects are stronger in districts with better access to basic services, broadly supporting arguments on behalf of political accountability. The third paper assesses the determinants of corruption across districts between 2001 and 2016 and analyses the effect of corruption on fiscal, service access, and financial audit outcomes. Similar to other developing countries, corruption has been a major problem in Indonesia. Largely ignored during the Soeharto era, the advent of democracy and decentralisation in the past two decades has led to widespread recognition of the severity of corruption, and stimulated a massive anti-corruption agenda, particularly through the establishment of the corruption eradication commission (KPK). Applying Poisson regressions, the paper finds that district location is a strong determinant of corruption. Districts that are farther from Jakarta and closer to provincial capitals are significantly more corrupt. Using geographic proximity as an instrument in two-stage least square regressions, the paper finds that more corruption leads to higher personnel spending, lower capital spending, and worse external financial audits. Corruption also reduces health spending and leads to slower improvement of access to health services. Utilising a newly developed database of corruption cases, this paper substantially extends the research on corruption in developing countries.
موضوع (اسم عام یاعبارت اسمی عام)
موضوع مستند نشده
Economics
موضوع مستند نشده
Political science
موضوع مستند نشده
Southeast Asian studies
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