Why Governance Failed After the Post-2011 Drawdown of Us Forces From Iraq?
نام ساير پديدآوران
Shoup, Brian D.
وضعیت نشر و پخش و غیره
نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره
Mississippi State University
تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره
2019
مشخصات ظاهری
نام خاص و کميت اثر
58
یادداشتهای مربوط به پایان نامه ها
جزئيات پايان نامه و نوع درجه آن
M.A.
کسي که مدرک را اعطا کرده
Mississippi State University
امتياز متن
2019
یادداشتهای مربوط به خلاصه یا چکیده
متن يادداشت
In this thesis I argue that US Military and Civilian leadership in Iraq, while both well-trained and well-intentioned, implemented a failed strategy that sought to fill institutional gaps within various national and sub-national governmental entities. This strategy provided short-term gains by increasing the capacity and capability of Iraq's government to deliver public goods and services to its citizens thereby improving government legitimacy. Yet, in the long-term, a largely decentralized approach to development, a maladaptive transition plan, and an illusory estimate of the capacity of the security apparatus within Iraq proved detrimental to the broader US strategic objectives and state-building efforts in Iraq.
موضوع (اسم عام یاعبارت اسمی عام)
موضوع مستند نشده
Political science
نام شخص به منزله سر شناسه - (مسئولیت معنوی درجه اول )