عنوان

How insurgencies end /

شابک

0833049836

شابک

9780833049834

شابک اشتباه

0833049526

شابک اشتباه

9780833049520

شماره

b722333

عنوان اصلي

How insurgencies end /

نام عام مواد

[Book]

نام نخستين پديدآور

Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki.

محل نشرو پخش و غیره

Santa Monica, CA :

نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره

RAND,

تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره

©2010.

تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره

©2010

نام خاص و کميت اثر

1 online resource (xxiv, 244 pages) :

ساير جزييات

illustrations (some color).

عنوان فروست

Rand Corporation monograph series ;

مشخصه جلد

MG-965-MCIA

متن يادداشت

Includes bibliographical references (pages 223-244).

متن يادداشت

Introduction -- Classifying outcomes and selecting cases -- Assessments of insurgency endings: time and external factors -- Assessments of insurgency endings: internal factors -- Assessments of insurgency endings: other factors -- Conclusions -- Appendix A: Case studies: methodology -- Appendix B: Supplemental findings -- Appendix C: Multivariate regression analysis -- Appendix D: Insurgencies not examined for this publication -- Appendix E: Categories used for the spring 2006 survey -- Appendix F: Unavoidable ambiguities -- Appendix G: Questions used for the autumn 2006 survey.

بدون عنوان

0

متن يادداشت

"This study tested conventional wisdom about how insurgencies end against the evidence from 89 insurgencies. It compares a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 89 insurgency case studies with lessons from insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) literature. While no two insurgencies are the same, the authors find that modern insurgencies last about ten years and that a government's chances of winning may increase slightly over time. Insurgencies are suited to hierarchical organization and rural terrain, and sanctuary is vital to insurgents. Insurgent use of terrorism often backfires, and withdrawal of state sponsorship can cripple an insurgency, typically leading to its defeat. Inconsistent support to either side generally presages defeat for that side, although weak insurgencies can still win. Anocracies (pseudodemocracies) rarely succeed against insurgencies. Historically derived force ratios are neither accurate nor predictive, and civil defense forces are very useful for both sides. Key indicators of possible trends and tipping points in an insurgency include changes in desertions, defections, and the flow of information to the COIN effort. The more parties in an insurgency, the more likely it is to have a complex and protracted ending. There are no COIN shortcuts."--Rand web site.

منبع سفارش / آدرس اشتراک

JSTOR

شماره انبار

22573/ctt2p3f

عنوان

How insurgencies end.

شماره استاندارد بين المللي کتاب و موسيقي

9780833049520

موضوع مستند نشده

Counterinsurgency, Case studies.

موضوع مستند نشده

Insurgency, Case studies.

موضوع مستند نشده

Counterinsurgency.

موضوع مستند نشده

HISTORY-- Military-- Other.

موضوع مستند نشده

insurgency.

موضوع مستند نشده

Insurgency.

موضوع مستند نشده

Law, Politics & Government.

موضوع مستند نشده

POLITICAL SCIENCE-- Security (National & International)

موضوع مستند نشده

Political Science.

موضوع مستند نشده

Political Theory of the State.

موضوع مستند نشده

TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING-- Military Science.

موضوع مستند نشده

Uppror.

موضوع مستند نشده

Upprorsbekämpning.

موضوع مستند نشده

HIS-- 027130

موضوع مستند نشده

POL012000

موضوع مستند نشده

POL042000

موضوع مستند نشده

TEC-- 025000

موضوع مستند نشده

TEC025000

شماره

ويراست

شماره رده

نشانه اثر

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Connable, Ben.

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Libicki, Martin C.

تاريخ عمليات

20201208140530.0

قواعد فهرست نويسي ( بخش توصيفي )

pn

نام الکترونيکي

نوع ماده

[Book]

تكميل شده

Y