عنوان

Matter and Form:

شماره

TL2hk26956

زبان متن نوشتاري يا گفتاري و مانند آن

انگلیسی

عنوان اصلي

Matter and Form:

نام عام مواد

[Thesis]

نام نخستين پديدآور

Hess, Keith Allan

عنوان اصلي به قلم نويسنده ديگر

Towards an Animalist Conception of Personal Identity

نام ساير پديدآوران

Zimmerman, Aaron

نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره

UC Santa Barbara

تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره

2017

کسي که مدرک را اعطا کرده

UC Santa Barbara

امتياز متن

2017

متن يادداشت

In this dissertation, I defend an answer to the following question in the diachronic personal identity debate: what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for our persistence over time? Two popular approaches to answering this question are the psychological and the somatic approach. On the former approach, we persist in virtue of some sort of psychological continuity. So, some proponents of the psychological approach think that we cease to exist if we lose certain features of our psychology such as our memories, beliefs, and rationality. On the latter approach, we persist in virtue of some sort of physical continuity. Eric Olson defends a version of the somatic approach called animalism. On his view, we are numerically identical to biological organisms and we persist if and only if the organisms we are persist. Although Olson's animalism has some benefits, it also faces some challenges. For example, many people would say that we go wherever our brains go (if we go anywhere at all) because our brains (more specifically, our cerebra) realize the aspects of our psychology traditionally associated with persons, such as memories, beliefs, rationality, and self-awareness. But on Olson's animalism, our psychology has nothing to do with our persistence and we go wherever our bodies go rather than our cerebra. Following Aristotle and Aquinas, I lay out an animalist view of our persistence called hylomorphic animalism. On this view, we are numerically identical to rational animals, which are living bodies composed of prime matter and a rational soul. Furthermore, we persist if and only if the composite of matter and rational soul persists. I claim that hylomorphic animalism makes better sense of certain contemporary personal identity thought experiments than Olson's animalism. For example, contra Olson, I argue that our psychology does have something to do with our persistence and that we go wherever our brains go.

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Hess, Keith Allan

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Zimmerman, Aaron

مستند نام تنالگان تاييد نشده

UC Santa Barbara

نام الکترونيکي

فرمت انتشار

p

نوع ماده

[Thesis]

کد کاربرگه

276903

سطح دسترسي

a

تكميل شده

Y