عنوان

Waging War among Civilians:

شماره

TL5rg476mq

زبان متن نوشتاري يا گفتاري و مانند آن

انگلیسی

عنوان اصلي

Waging War among Civilians:

نام عام مواد

[Thesis]

نام نخستين پديدآور

Manekin, Devorah Sarah

عنوان اصلي به قلم نويسنده ديگر

The Production and Restraint of Counterinsurgent Violence in the Second Intifada

نام ساير پديدآوران

Keller, Edmond

تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره

2012

کسي که مدرک را اعطا کرده

Keller, Edmond

امتياز متن

2012

متن يادداشت

Theories of violence against civilians in conflict have tended to view combatants in homogenous terms, as the obedient pawns of military elites, or as uniformly prone to violence due to passionate emotions or economic opportunism. In contrast, this study shows that combatant participation in violence is variable: While in some circumstances soldiers embrace violence eagerly, in others they attempt to shirk it or refuse to commit it outright. What accounts for this variation in violence and restraint? Why are some individuals, and some combat units, more likely to act violently than others? This dissertation examines these questions through a study of Israeli soldiers in the Second Intifada, employing interview, survey, and observational data. The core argument is that variation in combatant violence and restraint is a consequence of organizational control within the military. Drawing on theories in organizational and management studies, I define organizational control broadly to include not only formal mechanisms such as rules, discipline, and enforcement, but also informal mechanisms, such as the inculcation of values, norms, and beliefs through training and leadership. Through organizational control, the military seeks to align the preferences and beliefs of combatants regarding the use of violence with those of military leaders, ensuring that combatants both produce the violence demanded of them (strategic violence) and at the same time do not surpass or subvert such violence so that it no longer serves military interests but their own (opportunistic violence). I show that effective organizational control leads to participation patterns consistent with the preferences of armed group leaders - maximal participation in strategic violence and minimal participation in opportunistic violence. In contrast, weak control leads to participation patterns inconsistent with the preferences of armed group leaders - reduced participation in strategic violence and increased participation in opportunistic violence. When leader preferences are uncertain and control is ambiguous, new, entrepreneurial forms of violence emerge from the military's lower levels.

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Dauphine, David

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Manekin, Devorah Sarah

مستند نام تنالگان تاييد نشده

UCLA

نام الکترونيکي

فرمت انتشار

p

نوع ماده

[Thesis]

کد کاربرگه

276903

سطح دسترسي

a

تكميل شده

Y