عنوان
پدید آورنده
موضوع
رده
B105.I56 M46 2018eb
B105
.
I56
M46
2018eb
کتابخانه
محل استقرار
شابک
شابک
0190863811
شابک
9780190863814
شابک اشتباه
0190863803
شابک اشتباه
9780190863807
عنوان و نام پديدآور
عنوان اصلي
The phenomenal basis of intentionality /
نام عام مواد
[Book]
نام نخستين پديدآور
Angela Mendelovici.
وضعیت نشر و پخش و غیره
محل نشرو پخش و غیره
New York :
نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره
Oxford University Press,
تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره
2018.
مشخصات ظاهری
نام خاص و کميت اثر
1 online resource
یادداشتهای مربوط به کتابنامه ، واژه نامه و نمایه های داخل اثر
متن يادداشت
Includes bibliographical references and index.
یادداشتهای مربوط به مندرجات
متن يادداشت
Cover; Half title; Series page; The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Overview; Part One Introduction; 1. Fixing Reference on Intentionality; 1.1 Aboutness and Directedness; 1.2 The Ostensive Way of Fixing Reference; 1.3 Other Ways of Fixing Reference; 1.4 Worries with the Ostensive Definition; 1.5 Conclusion; 2. Goals and Methodology; 2.1 What is a Theory of Intentionality?; 2.2 Theory-Independent Access to Intentionality; 2.3 Conclusion; Part Two Alternative Theories of Intentionality; 3. The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories
متن يادداشت
3.1 Tracking Theories3.2 Overview of the Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories; 3.3 Background and Assumptions; 3.4 A Mismatch Case: Perceptual Color Representations; 3.5 Other Mismatch Cases; 3.6 Objections; 3.7 Reliable Misrepresentation and the Significance of Tracking; 3.8 Conclusion; Appendix A: Objections to the Mismatch Problem; 4. Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again; 4.1 The Functional Role Theory; 4.2 Worries with Short-Arm Functional Role Theories; 4.3 Worries with Long-Arm Functional Role Theories
متن يادداشت
4.4 The Real Problem with Both Tracking Theories and Functional Role Theories4.5 Conclusion; Part Three The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory; 5. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory; 5.1 The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory; 5.2 Arguments for PIT; 5.3 Identity PIT; 5.4 Challenging Cases; 5.5 Conclusion; Appendix B: The Extent of Phenomenal Intentionality; Appendix C: The Multiple Arisability of Intentional States; 6. PIT's Status as a Theory of Intentionality; 6.1 Is PIT a Theory of Intentionality in Terms of Phenomenal Consciousness?; 6.2 Is PIT Trivial?; 6.3 Is PIT Interesting?
متن يادداشت
6.4 Is PIT Naturalistic?6.5 Conclusion; Part Four Challenging Cases; 7. Thought; 7.1 The Challenge for PIT from Thought; 7.2 Thoughts' Phenomenal Contents; 7.3 Self-Ascriptivism about Thoughts' Alleged Contents; 7.4 Is Derived Mental Representation a Type of Intentionality?; 7.5 Conclusion: PIT about Thought; Appendix D: Derived Mental Representation in Perception; Appendix E: Attitudes; 8 Nonconscious States; 8.1 The Problem with Nonconscious States; 8.2 Derivativist Strategies; 8.3 Standing States; 8.4 Allegedly Nonconscious Occurrent States; 8.5 Conclusion; Part Five The Aspect View
متن يادداشت
9. Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content?9.1 The Relation View and the Aspect View; 9.2 Two Worries with the Relation View; 9.3 The Alleged Virtues of the Relation View; 9.4 Conclusion; Appendix F: The Aspect View and Adverbialism; Appendix G: Contents as First- or Second-Order States or Properties; Appendix H: An Internal Theory of Truth and Reference; Part Six Conclusion; 10. Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena; 10.1 Return to Other Ways of Fixing Reference on Intentionality; 10.2 Radical Internalism; Glossary; Bibliography; Index
بدون عنوان
0
بدون عنوان
8
بدون عنوان
8
بدون عنوان
8
بدون عنوان
8
یادداشتهای مربوط به خلاصه یا چکیده
متن يادداشت
Mendelovici proposes a novel theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness, arguing that the view avoids the problems of its competitors and can accommodate a wide range of cases, including those of thought and nonconscious states.
موضوع (اسم عام یاعبارت اسمی عام)
موضوع مستند نشده
Intentionality (Philosophy)
موضوع مستند نشده
Phenomenology.
موضوع مستند نشده
Intentionality (Philosophy)
موضوع مستند نشده
Phenomenology.
موضوع مستند نشده
PHILOSOPHY-- Movements-- Humanism.
مقوله موضوعی
موضوع مستند نشده
PHI-- 010000
رده بندی ديویی
شماره
128/
.
2
ويراست
23
رده بندی کنگره
شماره رده
B105
.
I56
نشانه اثر
M46
2018eb
نام شخص به منزله سر شناسه - (مسئولیت معنوی درجه اول )
مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده
Mendelovici, Angela A.,1982-
مبدا اصلی
تاريخ عمليات
20200822090930.0
قواعد فهرست نويسي ( بخش توصيفي )
pn
دسترسی و محل الکترونیکی
نام الکترونيکي
مطالعه متن کتاب اطلاعات رکورد کتابشناسی
نوع ماده
[Book]
اطلاعات دسترسی رکورد
تكميل شده
Y
