عنوان

Why intelligence fails :

شابک

0801447852 (cloth : alk. paper)

شابک

9780801447853 (cloth : alk. paper)

شماره

dltt

عنوان اصلي

Why intelligence fails :

نام عام مواد

[Book]

ساير اطلاعات عنواني

lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War /

نام نخستين پديدآور

Robert Jervis.

نام خاص و کميت اثر

238 pages ;

ابعاد

25 cm.

عنوان فروست

Cornell studies in security affairs

متن يادداشت

Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-227) and index.

متن يادداشت

Adventures in intelligence -- Failing to see that the Shah was in danger : introduction, postmortem, and CIA comments -- Analysis of NFAC's performance on Iran's domestic crisis, mid-1977-7 November 1978 -- CIA comments on the report -- The Iraq WMD intelligence failure : what everyone knows is wrong -- The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform.

بدون عنوان

0

متن يادداشت

"The U.S̀. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002." "The Iran case is based on a newly declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified." "In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations - analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind - were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information." "Policy prescriptions, including the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation." "In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved."--BOOK JACKET.

موضوع مستند نشده

United States.-- Evaluation

موضوع مستند نشده

Intelligence service-- United States-- Evaluation, Case studies.

موضوع مستند نشده

Iraq War, 2003-2011-- Military intelligence-- United States-- Evaluation.

موضوع مستند نشده

Weapons of mass destruction-- Iraq.

موضوع مستند نشده

Iran, History, Revolution, 1979.

بدون عنوان

0

شماره

ويراست

شماره رده

نشانه اثر

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Jervis, Robert,1940-

تاريخ عمليات

20100729104239.0

قواعد فهرست نويسي ( بخش توصيفي )

rda

نام الکترونيکي

نوع ماده

[Book]

تكميل شده

Y