Stephen Hetherington, the University of New South Wales.
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2016.
1 online resource
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Cover ; Half-title page; Title page; Copyright page; Dedication; Contents; Preface and Acknowledgements; 1 Introducing Gettierism; 1.1 The Year of Gettier; 1.2 Gettierism Introduced; 1.3 Gettier Cases Introduced; 1.4 Gettierism Refined; 1.5 Gettierism Finalized: Individual-Gettierism versus Property-Gettierism; 1.6 Gettieristic Responses to Gettier Cases; 1.7 Supporting Gettierism; 2 Explicating Gettierism: A General Challenge; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Fallibilism Underlying Gettierism; 2.3 A General Anti-Gettierism Argument; 2.3.1 The Strategy; 2.3.2 The Argument.
2.3.3 Objection: Merely Definitional?3 Explicating Gettierism: A Case Study; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Veritic Luck; 3.3 The Argument; 3.4 The Argument, More Metaphysically; 3.5 An Alternative Gettieristic Interpretation of Safety?; 3.6 Belief-Forming Methods; 3.7 The Backward Clock; 3.8 The Anti-Luck Intuition Supplanted; 4 Explicating Gettierism: Modality and Properties; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Objection: Modal Fallacy?; 4.2.1 The Objection; 4.2.2 The Property of Being Gettiered; 4.2.3 Property Preclusion; 4.2.4 Predicates for the Property of Being Gettiered; 4.2.5 Property Analysis.
4.3 Objection: Another Modal Fallacy?4.3.1 The Objection; 4.3.2 The Objection's Failure; 4.3.3 Individual-Gettierism versus Property-Gettierism, Again; 5 Explicating Gettierism: Infallibility Presuppositions; 5.1 A Question; 5.2 Some Gettieristic Reasoning; 5.3 Realistic Possibilities?; 5.4 A Case Study: Virtue-Theoretic Manifestation; 5.4.1 Sosa-Turri's Gettieristic Proposal; 5.4.2 Fallibilism within Gettier's Challenge; 5.4.3 Turri's Unwitting Infallibilism; 5.4.4 A Methodological Moral; 5.4.5 Manifestation Clarified; 5.5 Conclusion; 6 Gettierism and Its Intuitions; 6.1 Intuitive Support?
6.2 Gettier's Fallibilism, Again6.3 A Methodological Moral, Again; 6.4 A Methodological Question about Gettieristic Assessments; 6.5 A Methodological Problem for Gettieristic Assessments; 6.6 An Objection and Two Replies; 6.7 Conclusion; 7 Gettierism Improved; 7.1 A Compatibilist Aim; 7.2 An Old-Fashioned Account of Not Being Gettiered; 7.2.1 An Internalist Condition; 7.2.2 A Failabilist Condition; 7.2.3 A Non-Reductive Condition; 7.3 A Non-Reductive Justified-True-Belief Conception of Knowledge; References; Index.
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This book enriches our understanding of knowledge and Gettier's challenge. This will stimulate debate on a central epistemological issue.