عنوان
پدید آورنده
موضوع
رده
کتابخانه
محل استقرار
شماره کتابشناسی ملی
شماره
TLpq2408511473
زبان اثر
زبان متن نوشتاري يا گفتاري و مانند آن
انگلیسی
عنوان و نام پديدآور
عنوان اصلي
Voluntary Belief and Its Consequences in Locke and Descartes
نام عام مواد
[Thesis]
نام نخستين پديدآور
Boespflug, Mark
نام ساير پديدآوران
Pasnau, Robert
وضعیت نشر و پخش و غیره
نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره
University of Colorado at Boulder
تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره
2020
مشخصات ظاهری
نام خاص و کميت اثر
115
یادداشتهای مربوط به پایان نامه ها
جزئيات پايان نامه و نوع درجه آن
Ph.D.
کسي که مدرک را اعطا کرده
University of Colorado at Boulder
امتياز متن
2020
یادداشتهای مربوط به خلاصه یا چکیده
متن يادداشت
René Descartes and John Locke were some of history's most outstanding proponents of the idea that deontological concepts are appropriately applied to the domain of belief. Inasmuch as it is allowed that "ought" implies "can," then, this suggests that both authors held that our beliefs are somehow under our direct voluntary control. This is the central topic of this study: Locke and Descartes' respective positions on the degree of control that we have over our beliefs as well as the consequences of their respective positions on this issue for their broader epistemologies. In spite of their agreement regarding epistemic deontologism, however, I have found that Locke and Descartes' considered positions on doxastic voluntarism are quite different. In fact, they appear to occupy nearly opposite ends of the spectrum of possible positions on the voluntariness of belief. While Descartes maintains that all of our beliefs are the product of free decisions, Locke holds that essentially none of them are. Surprisingly enough, many scholars have undertaken to demonstrate the opposite: that is, they've attempted to extricate Descartes from his apparent deep commitment to voluntarism, and they've strived to implicate voluntarism of Locke in spite of his persistent disavowal of it. I argue that Descartes should be interpreted as a direct doxastic voluntarist and that Locke should be interpreted as a doxastic involuntarist.
موضوع (اسم عام یاعبارت اسمی عام)
موضوع مستند نشده
Belief
موضوع مستند نشده
Descartes
موضوع مستند نشده
Doxastic voluntarism
موضوع مستند نشده
Locke
موضوع مستند نشده
Rationality
موضوع مستند نشده
Will
نام شخص به منزله سر شناسه - (مسئولیت معنوی درجه اول )
مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده
Boespflug, Mark
مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده
Pasnau, Robert
دسترسی و محل الکترونیکی
نام الکترونيکي
مطالعه متن کتاب وضعیت انتشار
فرمت انتشار
p
اطلاعات رکورد کتابشناسی
نوع ماده
[Thesis]
کد کاربرگه
276903
اطلاعات دسترسی رکورد
سطح دسترسي
a
تكميل شده
Y
