Three Essays on the Microfoundations of Rebel Governance:
نام عام مواد
[Thesis]
نام نخستين پديدآور
Revkin, Mara Redlich
عنوان اصلي به قلم نويسنده ديگر
Theory and Evidence from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
نام ساير پديدآوران
Wood, Elisabeth J.
وضعیت نشر و پخش و غیره
نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره
Yale University
تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره
2019
مشخصات ظاهری
نام خاص و کميت اثر
347
یادداشتهای مربوط به پایان نامه ها
جزئيات پايان نامه و نوع درجه آن
Ph.D.
کسي که مدرک را اعطا کرده
Yale University
امتياز متن
2019
یادداشتهای مربوط به خلاصه یا چکیده
متن يادداشت
Despite growing interest in the study of "rebel governance", most previous research relies on cross-national studies and data that can be collected at a safe distance from conflict areas such as satellite imagery or archival documents. The success or failure of rebel movements depends largely on the decisions of civilians to either collaborate with or resist them, yet civilian experiences with rebel governance remain poorly understood due to the difficulty of interviewing and surveying populations during or immediately after conflict. This dissertation presents new theory and data on rebel institutions, civilian agency during rebel governance, and individual-level preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration of rebel collaborators after conflict using original quantitative and qualitative data collected on the case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The first article examines the relationship between natural resource endowments and the Islamic State's pattern of tax-policy implementation. "Greed"-based theories of the political economy of rebellion predict that armed groups will only implement taxation and other state-building activities in areas where they lack exploitable resources such as oil. This article presents an empirical puzzle that contradicts the predictions of greed-based theories with an original dataset that maps the spatial and temporal pattern of seven different types of tax policies implemented by the Islamic State in the 19 Syrian districts that the group governed between 2013 and 2017. Statistical analysis of this dataset indicates, contrary to the expectations of greed-based theories, that tax-policy implementation was just as prevalent in resource-rich as in resource-poor districts on average across time and space. I use this counter-intuitive quantitative finding to motivate two alternative explanations that I argue are more consistent with the observed pattern: Taxation was driven by the Islamic State's (1) ideology and (2) the costs of warfare. I then find support for these two explanations through an in-depth case study of al-Mayadin district, which is home to Syria's largest oil field and therefore an ideal site in which to investigate the puzzle of taxation by resource-rich rebels. The second article explores the determinants of displacement decisions during rebel governance through an original door-to-door survey of 1,458 residents of Mosul and qualitative data from my own in-depth fieldwork and interviews in Mosul. When the Islamic State first captured Mosul in June 2014, the group initially allowed civilians to enter and exit the city freely for several months. Despite the option of exit, an estimated 75 percent of Mosul's pre-Islamic State population of 1.2 million was still living in the city eight months after the group's arrival raising the question: Given the opportunity to leave Islamic State-held territory, who stayed and why? This question is important because rebel groups rely heavily on civilians to obtain food, water, shelter, labor, and information, and the Islamic State could not have captured and governed Mosul for as long as it did without the compliance and active support of some of the city's population. While recognizing that displacement decisions are multi-factorial, I find some support for a theory of "competitive governance": Civilians who perceived improvements in the quality of governance under Islamic State rule in comparison with the Iraqi state-in terms of the availability of electricity, cleanliness of streets, and crime rates-were more likely to stay than those who perceived no change or a deterioration. This finding suggests that weak rule of law and ineffective governance in Iraq may have contributed to civilian cooperation with the Islamic State. The third article, coauthored with Kristen Kao, addresses the following questions: What are the conditions under which civilians will accept those who collaborated a rebel group back into their community after conflict? How does variation in the identity of a collaborator (e.g. gender, age, or tribal identity) and the type of collaboration (e.g. combat, marriage to a combatant, employment in a civilian job, or payment of taxes) affect preferences for punishment and forgiveness? Does the severity of the punishment imposed on a collaborator (ranging from more lenient and restorative punishments such as community service to harsher ones such as imprisonment) affect the prospects for his or her peaceful reintegration into a post-conflict society? Through survey experiments conducted in Mosul, we identify the effects of hypothetical collaborators' identity and the type of collaboration on respondents' preferences for punishment, forgiveness, and reintegration. We find that, contrary to the Iraqi government's harsh and indiscriminate approach to Islamic State collaborators, Mosul residents differentiate between different types of collaborators and prefer more lenient punishments-or no punishment at all-for some of them. These findings have important implications for the design of transitional justice and peace-building processes in Iraq and other post-conflict settings.
موضوع (اسم عام یاعبارت اسمی عام)
موضوع مستند نشده
Law
موضوع مستند نشده
Political science
نام شخص به منزله سر شناسه - (مسئولیت معنوی درجه اول )