[edited by] David G. Mayes and Aarno Liuksila with Thorsten Beck [and others].
وضعیت نشر و پخش و غیره
محل نشرو پخش و غیره
New York :
نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره
Palgrave Macmillan,
تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره
2004.
مشخصات ظاهری
نام خاص و کميت اثر
xiii, 390 pages :
ساير جزييات
illustrations ;
ابعاد
23 cm
یادداشتهای مربوط به کتابنامه ، واژه نامه و نمایه های داخل اثر
متن يادداشت
Includes bibliographical references (pages 373-380) and index.
یادداشتهای مربوط به مندرجات
متن يادداشت
An overview of the issues / David G. Mayes -- The new approach to orderly bank exit : questions and answers / Aarno Liuksila -- Disclosures as a cure for Moral hazard : necessary but insufficient / Gary H. Stern -- The incentive-compatible design of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution : concepts and country studies / Thorsten Beck -- Small countries, large multi-country banks : a challenge to supervisors, the example of the Nordic-Baltic area / Jón Sigurosson -- The economic impact of insolvency law / Bethany Blowers and Gary Young -- Do bank exit regimes affect banking conditions / Peik Granlund -- A European approach to banking crises / Henk Brouwer, Gerbert Hebbink and Sandra Wesseling -- Avoiding a crisis : lessons from the Danish experience / Eigil Mølgaard -- Learning lessons and implementing a new approach to bank insolvency resolution in Switzerland / Eva H.G. Hüpkes -- Bank resolution policy and the organization of bank insolvency proceedings : critical dilemmas / Christos Hadjiemmanuil.
بدون عنوان
0
یادداشتهای مربوط به خلاصه یا چکیده
متن يادداشت
"In most countries taxpayers end up paying for bank failures and banking crises even though they are innocent of the cause. This book suggests how something can be done about this, so that problems can be resolved quickly when banks get into difficulties. Shareholders and uninsured creditors who are paid for taking risks would bear any losses. No one is worse off than under insolvency."
متن يادداشت
"Political pressures and the constraints of the legal system prevent suitable solutions in most countries outside the USA. The problem is particularly bad in Europe, where multinational banks are large compared with the size of the countries in which they operate. Coordination processes for solving problems in a hurry are inadequate. Banks may not be just 'too big to fail' but also 'too big to save' - a small country cannot afford the costs of remedial action alone."--Jacket.