عنوان

Nuclear deterrence theory :

شابک

0511551592

شابک

9780511551598

شابک اشتباه

0521375274

شابک اشتباه

9780521063999

شابک اشتباه

9780521375276

شماره

b754889

عنوان اصلي

Nuclear deterrence theory :

نام عام مواد

[Book]

ساير اطلاعات عنواني

the search for credibility /

نام نخستين پديدآور

Robert Powell.

محل نشرو پخش و غیره

New York :

نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره

Cambridge University Press,

تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره

1990.

نام خاص و کميت اثر

1 online resource (viii, 230 pages) :

ساير جزييات

illustrations

متن يادداشت

Includes bibliographical references and index.

متن يادداشت

Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation.

عنوان

Nuclear deterrence theory.

موضوع مستند نشده

Deterrence (Strategy)

موضوع مستند نشده

Nuclear warfare.

موضوع مستند نشده

Deterrence (Strategy)

موضوع مستند نشده

Nuclear warfare.

شماره

ويراست

شماره رده

نشانه اثر

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Powell, Robert,1956 July 7-

تاريخ عمليات

20201204144844.0

قواعد فهرست نويسي ( بخش توصيفي )

pn

نام الکترونيکي

نوع ماده

[Book]

تكميل شده

Y