edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard.
وضعیت نشر و پخش و غیره
محل نشرو پخش و غیره
New York :
نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره
Oxford University Press,
تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره
2009.
مشخصات ظاهری
نام خاص و کميت اثر
vi, 360 pages ;
ابعاد
24 cm
یادداشتهای مربوط به کتابنامه ، واژه نامه و نمایه های داخل اثر
متن يادداشت
Includes bibliographical references and index.
یادداشتهای مربوط به مندرجات
متن يادداشت
Introduction / Alan Millar, Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard -- I. Value of Knowledge -- 1. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge / Alvin Goldman and Erik J. Olsson -- 2. Is There a Value Problem? / Jason Baehr -- 3. Testimony and the Value of Knowledge / Martin Kusch -- 4. The Value of Understanding / Jonathan Kvanvig -- 5. Ugly Analyses and Value / Michael R. DePaul -- 6. The Goods and the Motivation of Believing / Ward E. Jones -- 7. Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge / Matthew Weiner -- 8. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value / Pascal Engel -- 9. Luck, Knowledge, and Control / Wayne D. Riggs -- II. Truth and Epistemic Appraisal -- 10. The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values / Michael P. Lynch -- 11. Epistemic Normativity / Stephen R. Grimm -- 12. Curiosity and the Value of Truth / Michael S. Brady -- 13. The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism, or, How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth / Berit Brogaard -- Appendix. Symposium on Jonathan Kvanvig's: The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding -- A. Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding / Jonathan Kvanvig -- B. The Value Problem / John Greco -- C. Is Understanding Factive? / Catherine Z. Elgin -- D. Understanding, Knowledge, and the Meno Requirement / Wayne D. Riggs -- E. Responses to Critics / Jonathan Kvanvig.
بدون عنوان
0
یادداشتهای مربوط به خلاصه یا چکیده
متن يادداشت
Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture?