Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 440.
یادداشتهای مربوط به مندرجات
متن يادداشت
Introduction --; The Game-Teoretic Model and Equilibrium Sets --; Experimental Design and Organisation of the Experiment --; Experimental Results --; Learning Theories --; Monte-Carlo Simulations and Testing of the Learning Direction Theory Against a Simple Alternative Theory --; Comparison of the Results of Direction Learning and the Simple Alternative Theory --; Summary.
یادداشتهای مربوط به خلاصه یا چکیده
متن يادداشت
The book investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design allows investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. A prominence level analysis is applied to the data and suggests that subjects tend to choose "round" numbers. It is shown that there exists a correlation between machiavellianism and subjects' adjustment behaviour in the game. The learning behaviour is discussed extensively. Plaintiffs' acceptance limits polarize at the beginning of the second play. A model of learning direction theory applied to explain subjects's behaviour over the course of the game.