عنوان

Interpretation and explanation in the human sciences /

شابک

0791414051 (CH : acid-free)

شابک

079141406X (PB : acid-free)

شابک

9780791414057 (CH : acid-free)

شابک

9780791414064 (PB : acid-free)

شماره

b524899

عنوان اصلي

Interpretation and explanation in the human sciences /

نام عام مواد

[Book]

نام نخستين پديدآور

David K. Henderson.

محل نشرو پخش و غیره

Albany :

نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره

State University of New York Press,

تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره

c1993.

نام خاص و کميت اثر

ix, 293 p. ;

ابعاد

24 cm.

عنوان فروست

SUNY series in the philosophy of the social sciences

متن يادداشت

Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-287) and indexes.

متن يادداشت

1. Interpretation and Explanation: Claims and Concerns -- 2. Standard Accounts of Interpretation and the Principle of Charity. 2.1. Standard Accounts of Interpretation. 2.1.1. The Holism of Interpretation. 2.1.2. A Fundamental Principle of Charity. 2.2. Common Refinements to the Principle of Charity. 2.2.1. Modifications Related to Stages of Interpretation. 2.2.2. Modifications Related to Types of Error -- 3. A Better Codification of the Constraints on Interpretation. 3.1. The Primacy of the Principle of Explicability: The Central Argument. 3.2. Two Concrete Illustrations. 3.2.1. The Treatment of Observation Sentences. 3.2.2. The Treatment of Truth-Functions. 3.3. Elaboration. 3.3.1. Empirical Adequacy. 3.3.2. Rules of Thumb. 3.3.3. Solving the Problem of Irrationality -- 4. On the Supposed A Priori Status of Minimal Rationality. 4.1. The View that Rationality is Constitutive of Intentional States. 4.1.1. A Priori Truths and "The Subject" as a Conceptual Matter.

متن يادداشت

4.1.2. Needed Perspective: An Extensional Notion of "The Subject" 4.2. On an Argument from Measurement. 4.3. On the Argument from Charity in Interpretation. 4.4. Is Minimal Rationality Preponderant Rationality: What is Central to Present Theory? 4.5. Summary and Significance. 4.6. Further Reflection on Minimal Rationality: Stich's Concerns. 4.6.1. Empirical Versus Conceptual Truths Revisited. 4.6.2. Acceptable and Unacceptable Similarity Bases for Interpretation -- 5. On the Supposed Privileged Place of Rationalizing Explanation. 5.1. Preliminaries. 5.1.1. The Basic Issue and What Is Sought to Resolve It. 5.1.2. The Rudimentary Received Model of Rationalizing Explanation. 5.1.3. On Theory-Dependent Versus Transcendent Preferred Statuses. 5.2. Rationalizing Explanation in Light of a General Account of Intentional Explanation. 5.2.1. Dispositions, Functional Analysis, and Semantic Interpretability. 5.2.2. Rationalizing Explanation and Nomic Generalizations.

متن يادداشت

5.2.3. Rationalizing Explanation and Irrationalizing Explanation are Epistemologically on a Par -- 6. Rationalizing Explanation and the Scientific Explanation of Events. 6.1. Restating Our Issue. 6.2. Why Explanations are Non-extensional and Why Normative Principles are Explanatorily Impotent. 6.3. Applications To Intentional Explanations -- 7. The Nomic Status of Psychological Generalizations: Handling Rosenberg's Refinability Problem. 7.1. Rosenberg's Challenge: Nomicity and Refinability. 7.2. An Illustrative Case. 7.3. Bootstrap Testing: Using our Theoretical Resources -- 8. In Defense of Heteronomic or Soft Laws. 8.1. The Issue: Can Psychological Generalizations Be Nomic? 8.2. Davidson's Suggestion That Heteronomic Generalizations Do Not Cite Causal Factors and Thus Cannot Be Nomic. 8.3. The Prima Facie Case for There Being Nomic Heteronomic Generalizations Citing Causal Factors. 8.4. Psychological Factors Can Be Causally Relevant: The Basic Solution to the Explanatory Exclusion Problem.

متن يادداشت

8.5. Kim's Misstep into Reductionism -- 9. Summary.

بدون عنوان

0

بدون عنوان

0

بدون عنوان

0

بدون عنوان

0

موضوع مستند نشده

Social sciences-- Philosophy.

شماره

ويراست

شماره رده

نشانه اثر

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Henderson, David K.,1954-

تاريخ عمليات

20130502102404.0

نام الکترونيکي

نوع ماده

[Book]

تكميل شده

Y