عنوان

An Identity Theory of Truth

شابک

1349628700

شابک

1349628727

شابک

9781349628704

شابک

9781349628728

شماره

b383719

عنوان اصلي

An Identity Theory of Truth

نام عام مواد

[Book]

نام نخستين پديدآور

by Julian Dodd.

محل نشرو پخش و غیره

London

نام ناشر، پخش کننده و غيره

Palgrave Macmillan UK : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan,

تاریخ نشرو بخش و غیره

2000.

متن يادداشت

This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer. The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modestThis book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer. The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modestThis book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer. The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest",,,,"This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer. The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest identity theory, which he goes on to distinguish from those identity theories propounded, at some time or other, by Russell, Moore, Bradley, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby. It is acknowledged that the modest identity theory provides neither a definition of truth nor an account of what truth consists in. The modest identity theory's role is, by contrast, that of diagnosing the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby preparing the ground for a proper deflation of the concept of truth: a deflation defended in the latter part of the book.

مستند نام اشخاص تاييد نشده

Julian Dodd

نام الکترونيکي

نوع ماده

[Book]

تكميل شده

Y