Idealism in Spinoza's Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Ethics:
General Material Designation
[Thesis]
First Statement of Responsibility
Butler, Sean
Title Proper by Another Author
A Friendly and Judicious Revision to the Active/Passive Distinction as Solution to Spinoza's Attribute and Parallelism Problems
Subsequent Statement of Responsibility
Easton, Patricia
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
The Claremont Graduate University
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2020
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
203
DISSERTATION (THESIS) NOTE
Dissertation or thesis details and type of degree
Ph.D.
Body granting the degree
The Claremont Graduate University
Text preceding or following the note
2020
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism admits of certain observed inconsistencies that have long troubled Spinoza scholars. The scholarship over the last one hundred and thirty years or so has offered three dominant interpretations of Spinoza's metaphysics as a result of the deficiencies with the doctrine of parallelism. These are 1) the subjective/objective distinction according to which the attribute of thought is understood as subjective and the attribute of extension is understood as objective, 2) materialism according to which the attribute of thought is claimed to depend on the attribute of extension, and 3) idealism according to which the attribute of extension is claimed to depend on the attribute of thought. A tension between materialism and idealism is addressed by each of these approaches. And the question of Spinozist idealism is of great concern to contemporary Spinoza scholarship. However, none of these interpretations succeed as they each fail to properly locate Spinoza's problems with parallelism in a deeper attribute problem. Interpretations 1 and 2 fail more severely for also clashing with other central themes of Spinoza's project such as his ethics which prioritizes thought at the expense of extension.