Petrostates and Territorial Disputes in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia:
General Material Designation
[Thesis]
First Statement of Responsibility
Ryu, Seung-ok
Title Proper by Another Author
How Domestic and International Pressures Affect Military Actions
Subsequent Statement of Responsibility
Duran-Martinez, Angelica
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
University of Massachusetts Lowell
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2020
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
323
DISSERTATION (THESIS) NOTE
Dissertation or thesis details and type of degree
Ph.D.
Body granting the degree
University of Massachusetts Lowell
Text preceding or following the note
2020
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
This dissertation analyzes why some petrostate leaders are risk-acceptant and are more likely to engage in military actions against other states, while other petrostate leaders try to avoid armed clashes with other states. It takes a critical view of the resource curse model which assumes petrostates to be conflict prone, because such model fails to explain why political decision-making processes differ among petrostates. Rather, I aim to show that decision-making processes in petrostates are similar to those of non-petrostates. I argue that to understand the decisions of petrostate leaders to militarily attack other states when facing territorial disputes, comprehensive analyses of domestic and international pressures, and alliance structures are necessary. To carry out such analysis this dissertation uses mixed methods. I use causal process tracing (CPT) methods in four case studies to analyze how series of historical moments result in similar or different outcomes: the cases are Venezuela's territorial disputes with Guyana (1982, 1999) and Colombia (1987), and Saudi Arabia's dispute with Yemen (1998). Regression analysis is used to see whether general trends between cases exist and to assess the likelihood of military actions comparing five operationalization of petrostates (inclusive, inclusive without great powers (China, Russia, and the United States), dependent, abundant, and abundant without great powers). The results indicate that petrostate leaders' decisions are impacted by domestic and international pressures, and alliance structures. The severity of attacks varies depending on how leaders perceive such pressures and how alliances are balanced. The statistical findings align with the idea that petrostate leaders are not always more likely to attack militarily than non-petrostates.