Actors, Strategies and Coordination in Iranian Electoral Politics
General Material Designation
[Thesis]
First Statement of Responsibility
Rahimkhani, Kourosh
Subsequent Statement of Responsibility
Filippov, Mikhail
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
State University of New York at Binghamton
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2020
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
167
DISSERTATION (THESIS) NOTE
Dissertation or thesis details and type of degree
Ph.D.
Body granting the degree
State University of New York at Binghamton
Text preceding or following the note
2020
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Most of the literature on contemporary electoral authoritarianism focuses on how nondemocratic leaders use political institutions such as elections to reduce political infighting among ruling elites, co-opt opposition groups, and mobilize popular support for incumbents. However, these studies do not explain the variation in the performance of opposition groups in the electoral arena. Thus, this study focuses on (a) the conditions under which opposition groups can pose a credible challenge to nondemocratic regimes and (b) how an electoral surprise affects a nondemocratic leader's responses. The two main questions of this study are as follows: (a) What opposition strategies can successfully challenge a nondemocratic regime? and (b) Under what conditions will a nondemocratic leader change his electoral strategies? I answer these questions through the case study of Iranian postrevolutionary electoral politics. As opposition groups learn how to use the electoral institution to coordinate, nondemocratic leaders try to block these loopholes in the electoral arena. Employing electoral malfeasance is necessary for nondemocratic leaders to control electoral outcomes. Thus, nondemocratic leaders employ all other means at their disposal, including a divide-and-rule strategy, to exacerbate divisions among their opponents. However, the opposition camp can neutralize electoral malpractice by (a) solving problems of coordination among the polarized opponents of the leader and (b) delivering a unified message of change to voters. Therefore, it becomes critical for nondemocratic leaders to prevent opportunities that pave the way for such coordination. In this study, I investigate Iranian elections between 1980 and 2017 at two levels-presidential and parliamentary-and scrutinize the ability of both the regime and the opposition coalition to mobilize the masses in large and small cities. Iranian electoral politics illustrates that there have been elections where the opposition camp has neutralized electoral malpractice and has outperformed it. It has happened when against all the efforts of the regime (i.e., the establishment), the opponents of the status quo (i.e., the nonestablishment) have been able to solve problems of coordination among themselves at different levels of both presidential and legislative elections. The results of this study have important lessons for the democratization literature and explain the capacities and limitations of political institutions such as elections for both the regime and opposition during a transition process. The political actors in the opposition camp gradually learn how to use the electoral arena to pose a real challenge to the nondemocratic regime. However, a threat from electoral arena forces a nondemocratic leader to increase electoral suppression.