the identification and pooling of information by groups of political agents
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2011
DISSERTATION (THESIS) NOTE
Dissertation or thesis details and type of degree
Ph.D.
Body granting the degree
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Text preceding or following the note
2011
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
This thesis addresses the mechanisms by which groups of agents can track the truth, particularly in political situations. I argue that the mechanisms which allow groups of agents to track the truth operate in two stages: firstly, there are search procedures; and secondly, there are aggregation procedures. Search procedures and aggregation procedures work in concert. The search procedures allow agents to extract information from the environment. At the conclusion of a search procedure the information will be dispersed among different agents in the group. Aggregation procedures, such as majority rule, expert dictatorship and negative reliability unanimity rule, then pool these pieces of information into a social choice. The institutional features of both search procedures and aggregation procedures account for the ability of groups to track the truth and amount to social epistemic mechanisms. Large numbers of agents are crucial for the epistemic capacities of both search procedures and aggregation procedures. This thesis makes two main contributions to the literature on social epistemology and epistemic democracy. Firstly, most current accounts focus on the Condorcet Jury Theorem and its extensions as the relevant epistemic mechanism that can operate in groups of political agents. The introduction of search procedures to epistemic democracy is (mostly) new. Secondly, the thesis introduces a two-stage framework to the process of group truth-tracking. In 4 addition to showing how the two procedures of search and aggregation can operate in concert, the framework highlights the complexity of social choice situations. Careful consideration of different types of social choice situation shows that different aggregation procedures will be optimal truth-trackers in different situations. Importantly, there will be some situations in which aggregation procedures other than majority rule will be best at tracking the truth.
TOPICAL NAME USED AS SUBJECT
JA Political science (General)
PERSONAL NAME - PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
Thompson, Christopher Jeremy
CORPORATE BODY NAME - SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITY
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)