the politics of currency management in 1960s Britain
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
University of Warwick
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2005
DISSERTATION (THESIS) NOTE
Dissertation or thesis details and type of degree
Ph.D.
Body granting the degree
University of Warwick
Text preceding or following the note
2005
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
The 1967 devaluation of sterling has been the subject of considerable academic interest. However, its aftermath represents one of the great silences in the literature. This thesis aims to rectify this deficiency. The principal argument is that the devaluation may have been avoidable in the short-term but in implementation; the shift in parity was not a significant event in itself. It must be viewed as a setting change rather than an instrument shift. Therefore, its real importance rest in its legacy because its implementation was to greatly alter the context within which sterling's managers operated. In the aftermath, the problem of sterling was actually far greater than it had ever been before and the solutions proposed were far more radical. During 1968, the Treasury and the Bank of England devised three main solutions to the problem of sterling. The first, Operation Brutus, was designed to block the sterling balances to ensure that the pound would maintain parity with the dollar. The operation would have» necessitated the re-introduction of rationing, a ban on foreign travel and strict controls over I) imports. During the gold crisis of March 1968 the core executive came close to implementing I the plan. Second, in September 1968, the Bank and Treasury implemented the Basle agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, sterling area countries undertook not to diversify their reserves any further, on the understanding that the British government would write up their balances if the pound was again devalued. This agreement marked the implementation of a fresh instrument with which to stabilise sterling's parity within the fixed rate Bretton Woods system. Consequently, it was of far greater importance than the devaluation. Third, by the end of 1968 members of the core executive began to question the sanctity of Bretton Woods and devised Operation Hecuba, which was a plan to float the pound. Although it was not implemented during the Wilson government's term of office, it formed the basis of the 1972 operation to float sterling.