Does Science Have to Be Causal in Order to Be Science? Reflections on Nina Azaris Questions
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[Article]
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Harald Walach
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Leiden
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Brill
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Text of Note
Nina Azari in her commentary on our article in this issue "Spirituality: The Legacy of Parapsychology" has raised the issue of what it actually takes for something to be called science. Does causality come into the picture? If so, how does causality relate to our non-local model that seems to explicitly eschew the question of causality? The answer lies in what one is willing to accept as causality. If causality can be conceived broader than just efficient-mechanistic causality then certainly our model is causal. If one insists on efficient-mechanistic causality as the only and truly scientific notion of causality, it is not. But then, I would argue, this is a very restricted and also short sighted view which should be questioned, and eventually, disregarded. This is what we have set out to do. Nina Azari in her commentary on our article in this issue "Spirituality: The Legacy of Parapsychology" has raised the issue of what it actually takes for something to be called science. Does causality come into the picture? If so, how does causality relate to our non-local model that seems to explicitly eschew the question of causality? The answer lies in what one is willing to accept as causality. If causality can be conceived broader than just efficient-mechanistic causality then certainly our model is causal. If one insists on efficient-mechanistic causality as the only and truly scientific notion of causality, it is not. But then, I would argue, this is a very restricted and also short sighted view which should be questioned, and eventually, disregarded. This is what we have set out to do.