Arab politics, Palestinian nationalism and the Six Day War :
General Material Designation
[Book]
Other Title Information
the crystallization of Arab strategy and Nasir's descent to war, 1957-1967 /
First Statement of Responsibility
Moshe Shemesh.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Portland :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Sussex Academic Press,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2008.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
xxi, 345 pages :
Other Physical Details
illustrations, map ;
Dimensions
26 cm
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
Text of Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 334-339) and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
The Arab-Israeli conflict escalates, 1957-1963: a turning point in the Arab states' attitudes towards the Palestinian problem -- Formulation of Arab strategy in the Israeli-Arab conflict, 1964-1965: prelude to the Six Day War -- Failure of the Arab plan for diverting the River Jordan's tributaries -- The rise of the Palestinians as a factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict -- The Fida'iyyun organizations' contribution to the descent to the Six Day War -- The Arab military build-up -- Nasir's steps toward the Six Day War: May 13 to June 5, 1967 -- In the wake of the Six Day War.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
"The Six Day War was the climax in the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The downturn began in 1957 when Nasir began preaching the idea of Arab nationalism, while placing the Palestinian problem at its centre. The decade between the Sinai War and Six Day War was marked by preparations by both sides for an all-out military confrontation which both sides viewed as inevitable. As the Arab states formulated their positions on the conflict's goals and the ways of attaining them, differences of opinion erupted between Egypt and Syria. Nasir wanted to decide the time and place for the war that would "liberate Filastin". He was determined to meet Israel on the battlefield only when he was certain that the outcome would mean a decisive Arab victory. He consciously and strategically led Egypt to war, carefully weighing the implications of each political/military step." "This study, based almost exclusively on hitherto unavailable Arab primary sources, sets out the crystallization of Arab strategy to reveal conclusions substantively different from previous scholarly and political-military assessments. Issues dealt with include: the relevance of the Filastin problem as key to understanding the descent to war; the pivotal Syrian water struggle as a key motivating factor; Nasir's military blunders with respect to advice received from the Egyptian High Command; Nasir's acceptance of the principle that Egypt had to absorb the first Israeli strike, to be followed by Egypt's delivery of a second, decisive strike; the "political process" approach to solving the conflict as evidenced by the Khartoum protocols notwithstanding the "1948 refugee problem"; and the Hashemite regime's response to Palestinians' heightened national awakening. The enlistment of all the Arab states to Nasir's moves in May 1967 testifies not only to the president's charismatic leadership, but also to the depths of the 1948 trauma (al-nakba), which lies at the heart of any future compromise or agreement."--Jacket.
OTHER EDITION IN ANOTHER MEDIUM
Title
Arab politics, Palestinian nationalism and the Six Day War.