عنوان

Reasons and purposes :

(Number (ISBN

0199250375

(Number (ISBN

9780199250370

Number

b773916

Title Proper

Reasons and purposes :

General Material Designation

[Book]

Other Title Information

human rationality and the teleological explanation of action /

First Statement of Responsibility

G.F. Schueler.

Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.

New York :

Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.

Oxford University Press,

Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.

2003.

Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item

xii, 174 pages ;

Dimensions

23 cm

Text of Note

Includes bibliographical references (pages 166-171) and index.

Text of Note

1. 1. Purposes, Causes, and Reasons Explanations Purposes -- 2. Reasons and Causes -- 3. Causes and Causal Explanations -- 4. 2. Non Telelogical Explanations of Actions The Argument for 'The Humean Theory of Motivation' -- 5. Are 'Causal' Explanations Unavoidable? -- 6. 3. Teleological Explanations of Actions The Need for Teleological Explanaations -- 7. Character Traits -- 8. 4. Explaining in Terms of the Agent's Reasoning Problems with the Practical Syllogism -- 9. Practical Reasoning and the Explanation of Actions -- 10. Practical Reasoning and Evaluations -- 11. The Principle of Charity -- 12. 5. The Inherently Normative Nature of Action Explanations Normative Explanations I: The Deliberative Model -- 13. Normative Explanations II: The Agent's Perspective.

0

Text of Note

"People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do." "G. F. Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept."--Jacket.

Intentionality (Philosophy)

Practical reason.

Intentionnalité (Philosophie)

Raison pratique.

08.36 philosophical anthropology, philosophy of psychology.

Handelingstheorie.

Handlungstheorie

Intentionaliteit.

Intentionality (Philosophy)

Intentionality (Philosophy)

Practical reason.

Practical reason.

Praktische Vernunft

Rationaliteit.

Number

Edition

Class number

Book number

Class number

Class number

System Code

Schueler, G. F.

Date of Transaction

20201203061549.0

Electronic name

[Book]

Y