Venture capitalists' exit strategies under information asymmetry :
General Material Designation
[Book]
Other Title Information
evidence from the US venture capital market /
First Statement of Responsibility
Matthias Eckermann.
EDITION STATEMENT
Edition Statement
1. Aufl.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Wiesbaden :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2006.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
1 online resource (xvii, 287 pages) :
Other Physical Details
illustrations
SERIES
Series Title
Gabler Edition Wissenschaft
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
Text of Note
Includes bibliographical references.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
Venture Capital Investing -- Exiting Ventures -- Building an Analytical Framework -- Research Methodology -- Empirical Analysis -- Conclusion and Implications.
0
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Venture capitalists (VCs) fund ventures with the aim of reaping a capital gain upon exit. Research has identified information asymmetry between inside investors and follow-on investors as a major source of friction. It is thus in the interest of VCs to reduce information asymmetry at exit. Matthias Eckermann analyzes how VCs integrate information efficiency considerations into their exit strategies. He shows that VCs adopt specific strategies to cope with information gaps upon exit in terms of timing, exit vehicles and promotion efforts. On this basis he develops a framework to help VCs to improve profitability through decisive exit strategies.
ACQUISITION INFORMATION NOTE
Source for Acquisition/Subscription Address
Springer
Stock Number
978-3-8350-0126-8
OTHER EDITION IN ANOTHER MEDIUM
Title
Venture capitalists' exit strategies under information asymmetry.