government spending and the design of institutions /
First Statement of Responsibility
David M. Primo.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Chicago :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
University of Chicago Press,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2007.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
1 online resource (xiii, 203 pages) :
Other Physical Details
illustrations
SERIES
Series Title
American politics and political economy series
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
Text of Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 175-188) and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
List of Illustrations; Acknowledgments; 1 : Introduction; 2 : Rule Design and Enforcement; 3 : External Enforcement; 4 : Internal Enforcement; 5 : The U.S. States; 6 : The Federal Government; 7 : Conclusion; Appendix A. Technical Material for Chapter 3; Appendix B. Technical Material for Chapter 4; Appendix C. Technical Material for Chapter 5; Appendix D. Technical Material for Chapter 6; Notes; References; Index.
0
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
Government spending has increased dramatically in the United States since World War II despite the many rules intended to rein in the insatiable appetite for tax revenue most politicians seem to share. Drawing on examples from the federal and state governments, Rules and Restraint explains in lucid, nontechnical prose why these budget rules tend to fail, and proposes original alternatives for imposing much-needed fiscal discipline on our legislators. One reason budget rules are ineffective, David Primo shows, is that politicians often create and preserve loopholes to protect programs that bene.