Includes bibliographical references (pages 323-340) and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
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Part I: The main ideas I -- The main ideas II -- The second-person stance and second-personal reasons -- Part II: Accountability and the second person -- Moral obligation and accountability -- Respect and the second person -- Part III: The psychology of the second person -- Interlude: Hume versus Reid on Justice (with contemporary resonances) -- Part IV: Morality and autonomy in Kant -- The second person and dignity: variations on Fichtean Themes -- Freedom and practical reason -- Foundation for contractualism.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
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"Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner - along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue - result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral obligation. After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to change the subject - falling back on nonmoral values or practical, first-person considerations - Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations : their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community."--Jacket.