Willing as practical knowing -- The will and practical judgment -- Fundamental practical judgments : the wish for happiness -- From presuppositions of judgment to the idea of a categorical imperative -- The formal presuppositions of practical judgment -- Constraints on willing -- Interpretation -- The categorical imperative -- Applications.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
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Immanuel Kant's claim that the categorical imperative of morality is based in practical reason has long been a source of puzzlement and doubt, even for sympathetic interpreters. In The Form of Practical Knowledge, Stephen Engstrom provides an illuminating new interpretation of the categorical imperative, arguing that we have exaggerated and misconceived Kant's break with tradition. By developing an account of practical knowledge that situates Kant's ethics within his broader epistemology, Engstrom's work deepens and reshapes our understanding of Kantian ethics.
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