edited by Christian Schubert and Georg von Wangenheim.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
New York :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Routledge,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
2006.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
1 online resource (xii, 214 pages) :
Other Physical Details
illustrations
SERIES
Series Title
Studies in global competition ;
Volume Designation
v. 26
GENERAL NOTES
Text of Note
"Contributions to an inter-disciplinary workshop that has taken place at the Max-Planck-Institute of Economics (the former Max-Planck-Institute for Research into Economic Systems) in Jena, Germany, in February 2004"--Preface.
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
Text of Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
Book Cover; Half-Title; Series-Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction; 1 Institutional design, social norms and preferences in an evolving economy; Part I Designed institution, preferences and behaviour; 2 Institutions shape preferences: The approach of ""Psychology & Economics""; 3 Legislation and countervailing effects from social norms; 4 Social motives and institutional design; Part II Emergenece and change of designed institutions; 5 Preferences in social interaction and their influence on formal institutions.
Text of Note
6 The complexity of rules and how they may evolve over time7 Gradualism and public entrepreneurship in the evolution of formal institutions; Part III Normative perspectives; 8 A contractarian view on institutional evolution; 9 Probing the welfare prospects of legal competition; 10 Human intentionally and design in cultual evolution; Index.
0
8
SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
This book comprises nine papers approaching designed institutions and their interplay with spontaneous institutions from various angles. While the evolution of spontaneous institutions is quite well understood in economic thinking, the development of consciously designed institutions has been examined much less. In new institutional economics, public choice, and law and economics the interaction between changing preferences and spontaneously evolving institutions on the one hand and the evolution of designed institutions (as, e.g., legal systems) on the other hand has largely been ignored. A.