compliance with international regulatory agreements /
First Statement of Responsibility
Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes.
.PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC
Place of Publication, Distribution, etc.
Cambridge, Mass. :
Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.
Harvard University Press,
Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.
1995.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item
xii, 417 pages ;
Dimensions
25 cm
INTERNAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES/INDEXES NOTE
Text of Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 303-404) and index.
CONTENTS NOTE
Text of Note
1. A Theory of Compliance -- pt. I. Sanctions. 2. Treaty-Based Military and Economic Sanctions. 3. Membership Sanctions. 4. Unilateral Sanctions -- pt. II. Toward a Strategy for Managing Compliance. 5. Norms. 6. Transparency, Norms, and Strategic Interaction. 7. Reporting and Data Collection. 8. Verification and Monitoring. 9. Instruments of Active Management. 10. Policy Review and Assessment. 11. Nongovernmental Organizations. 12. Revitalizing International Organizations -- Appendix: List of Treaties.
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SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT
Text of Note
In an increasingly complex and interdependent world, states resort to a bewildering array of regulatory agreements to deal with problems as disparate as climate change, nuclear proliferation, international trade, satellite communications, species destruction, and intellectual property. In such a system, there must be some means of ensuring reasonably reliable performance of treaty obligations. The standard approach to this problem, taken by academics and politicians alike, is to search for treaties with "teeth"--Military or economic sanctions to deter and punish violation.
Text of Note
The New Sovereignty argues that this approach is misconceived. Cases of coercive enforcement are rare, and sanctions are too costly and difficult to mobilize to be a reliable enforcement tool. As an alternative to this "enforcement" model, the authors propose a "managerial" model for ensuring treaty compliance. It relies on the elaboration and application of treaty norms in a continuing dialogue among the parties, international officials, and nongovernmental organizations - and it is this dialogue that generates pressure to resolve problems of noncompliance. In the process, the norms and practices of the regime themselves evolve and develop.